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Pet rs raise several objections to their federal obscenity convictions,
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rather than the Roth-Memoirs test, to this pre-Miller conduct; (2) the appellate

-

~~~

jOl'tJl,b,,n I

tu fu:t

( 1) the jury was instructed to apply the Miller test of obscenity,

.

judges failed personally to view the material in question to determine whether it
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obscene; and (3) the jury was instructed that it should apply the community

'7tt : 1 . ~ d a r d s of the Eastern District of Kentucky,
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1.

FACTS: Petrs were indicted for conspiracy and for eight substantive

counts of transporting obscene films interstate for the purposes of sale and
distribution, in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 1465.
Throat," "Swing High,

11

The films involved were "Deep

and six previews with similar titles.

described in detail in the CA 6 opinion, petn., p. A 3.

Their contents are

All petrs were convicted

of conspiracy and acquitted on one of the substantive counts; all but one (a company)
were convicted of the seven other substantive counts.
The trial judge (Swinton, E. D. Ky.) instructed the jury to apply the Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), test of obscenity (the work taken as a whole lac ks
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value), instead of the RothMemoirs test (the material is utterly without redeeming social value).

The judge

also instructed the jury to apply the community standards of the Eastern District

of Kentucky; he did, however, permit evidence of what the community standards of
the Cincinnati area were.
On appeal, CA 6 affirmed.

The court did not view the films, but looked

instead to the detailed search-warrant affidavits and other descriptions of the,.
;

material.

It concluded, insofar as is here relevant, that the judge properly

limited the community area to the Eastern District of Kentucky, under Hamling v .
United States , 418 U.S. 87 (1974).

The court also r ejected petrs' argument that

the trial judge should have instructed the jury on only the Roth-Memoirs test, but

the court's 'holding in this regard is not entirely clear.

First, CA 6 noted that

several circuits have held that the Roth - Memoirs instruction must be given in ca ses
where pre-Miller offenses are charged, and d.eclined to follow those cases; it too k
its lead from the fact that in Miller its elf the Court remanded for retrial under th e

- 3 new, Miller standard.

CA 6 also noted that in Hamling this Court had referred to

Miller as simply a "clarifying gloss" on a similar federal statute, 418 U.S., at
116, in order to reject the claim that the statute as applied before Miller was
impermis sibly vague.

Second, the court concluded that the application of the

Roth-Memoirs test would not have helped petrs, since these films were in fact
obscene under either standard.

Judge McCree dissented; he would have remanded

for a new trial with a Roth-Memoirs standard.
2.

CONTENTIONS: Petrs argue that the Miller charge denied them due

process, citing the CA decisions that conflict with CA 6 1 s decision in this case.
United States v. Sherpix, Inc., 512 F.2d 1361 (CA DC 1975); United States v.
Wasserman, 504 F. 2d 1012 (CA 5 1974); United States v. Jacobs, 513 F. 2d 564
(CA 9 1975).

Those courts generally reasoned "that the Roth-Memoirs gloss on

'obscenity' did not give appellant adequate notice that his conduct would be judged
by the expanded standard ultimately applied,

11

513 F. 2d, at 565 (CA 9), because

Miller had enlarged the coverage of the statute.
378 U.S. 347 (1964).

See Bouie v. City of Columbia,

The SG admits the conflict, but argues that there is no ,reason
~

;

to resolve it here, since CA 6 concluded that even under Roth-Memoirs, the films
were obscene.

He also argues that the issue will fade away as Miller ages.

Petr-s argue that CA_ 6 was constitutionally required to view the film, citing
_;;:_-----~
,,,_.,, =--==
--" ~
~
cases in which this Court has done so.

See, ~ · , Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. ~

370 U.S. 478 (1962); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).

1

-

The SG argues that

~ this Court has never so held, although individual Justices have accepted the

proposition, Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 162 (Brennan, J., concurring in the result).
Petrs also claim a conflict on this point with Clicque v. United States, 514 F. 2d
923 (CA 5 1975).

Here CA 6 adequately informed itself a 's to the contents of the

'

.
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films, and petrs had all the appellate review to which they were entitled.

Clicque

is not to the contrary, since the court there held only that a DC must m ake a determination that the material is obscene in accepting a guilty plea to an obsc e nity
charge.
Finally, petrs argue that the judge should have instructed the jury to appl y

the community standards of the Cincinnati area, not the Eastern District of
Kentucky.

Many of the jurors worked in Cincinnati; none were familiar with the

"standards" in the rural parts of the judicial district.

The SG argues that the

instruction was within the latitude given district judges by Hamling v. United Sta tes.

418 U.S. 87, 105-106 (1974).

3.

DISCUSSION: On the first point, CA 6 1 s alternative conclusion remov es

the conflict.

If the films are actually obscene under the Roth-Memoirs test, then

petrs were on adequate notice that their conduct violated the law.

Their convicti on

by a federal jury charged under the Miller test might raise serious Seventh Ame nd -

~"'"->

ment problems,l\.since CA 6 appears to have rested its affirmance on the applicati on
of a rather different test.
CA 6' s tack.

None of the CAs in the "conflicting" decisions to5>k,.

Only CA 5 declined to do so exp res sly:

"[I]t would be inappropriat e

for this court to usurp the jury function of applying the Roth-Memoirs test to the
materials at issue." 504 F.2d, at 1016 n. 11.

Nor do the Miller remand, and the

DWSFQ entered in Miller II, 418 U.S. 915 (1974), implicitly decide the issue,
since the defendants in cases of that vintage were first convicted when the RothMemoirs t e s ; p ~ .

Judge McCree suggested this point in his dissent, but pe trs

do not argue it at all here.
The SG seems to be correct with respect to the other points.
There is a response.
Ros sit er

2/2/76 DK

CA 6 Op in petn.

LFP/vsl
7/27/76

(

No. 75-708, Marks, et al, v. United States

This memorandum, dictated after a preliminary look at
the briefs, is intended only as an "aid to memory" that will
refresh my recollection when I return to a more careful study
of the case prior to argument and decision.

When an opinion is

expressed or intimated, it is wholly tentative.

(
* * * * *
This is an obscenity case that presents the following
three questions:

(

1. Whether in an obscenity prosecution
that took place after Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, for conduct that occurred before
~hat decision, the district court properly charged
the jury under the standards announced in that
decision.
2. Whether a court of appeals must view
the materials in order to determine whether
they are protected by the First Amendment.
3. Whether the jury was properly instructed to assess the materials in terms of
the community standards of the judicial district from which the jurors were selected and
in which the trial was held.

No. 75-708

(

2.

Petitioners were indicted, tried and convicted on
several counts for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1465, for knowingly
transporting in commerce obscene films, and also were convicted
for conspiring to violate§ 1465.

But, as the SG's brief notes,

petitioners were "caught in a period of transition."

Their con-

duct took place prior to Miller, and their trial took place after
that decision.
We granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, as I recall it, to resolve a conflict among the
circuits as to whether the Miller standards -- to the extent they
differ from the Memoirs/Roth standards, apply retroactively.
(

Although the Solicitor General opposed the granting of cert, and
appeared to think at that time that the retroactivity issue was
insubstantial, he now agrees with petitioners that CA6 erred in
appr9ving -- in effect -- such a retroactive application.

CA6

(McRee, dissenting) held that the particular films in question
(De~p Throat, etc.) were obscene under any standard.

But, as

pointed out in Judge McRee's dissent, the jury was instructed only

•
under the Miller standard.

It therefore was not possible for

reviewing courts to be sure what the jury would have concluded had
it been properly instructed.
Bu~, the parties are in agreement in this Court that

(

there was reversible error on the retroactivity issue.

No. 75-708

(

3.

The SG also agrees with petitioners that a court of
appeals must view films (or other material alleged to be obscene)
in order to determine whether they are protected by the First
Amendment.

Thus, on the second question, the parties are in

agreement and no controversy remains.
The only remaining issue is whether the jury was properly
instructed to apply the contemporary community standards of the
judicial district in which the trial took place rather than
charge the jury on the local community standards of the CincinnatiCovington metropolitan area.

The parties do disagree on this issue,

and I am inclined to think the SG has the better of the argument.

(

There is language in Hamlin (418 !U.S. at 105-06) that
supports the view that ordinarily the judicial district in which
the trial takes place constitutes the relevant community.

Jurors

are drawn from the district, and may be presumed to know as much
about community standards as jurors drawn from some particular
segment of the district.

This may not always be the case, but I

doubt whether _ this type of difference attains constitutional
dimensions.
This case involved moving pictures being shown in local
theaters in Covington, Kentucky, which is within the metropolitan
area of Cincinnati.
(

* * * *

No. 75-708

(

4.

The SG's brief, agreeing with petitioners on what I
thought was the principal issue in this case, considerably undermines its importance.

Subject to f~rther consideration, I think

the case could be disposed of by a per curiam opinion.
The "cormjmnity standards" issue is not free from
difficulty, but I know of no really satisfactory solution.

In

a country as large and diverse as ours, there are relatively few
national standards with respect to arguably obscene material that
fairly could be applied everywhere.

The standards of Times

Square in New York would create a riot in the Ozark Mountains.

(

(
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No. 75-708, Marks, et al, v. United States

This memorandum, dictated after a preliminary look at
the briefs, is intended only as an "aid to memory" that will
refresh my recollection when I return to a more careful study
of the case prior to argument and decision.

When an opinion is

expressed or intimated, it is wholly tentative.

* * * * *
This is an obscenity case that presents the following
three questions:
1. Whether in an obscenity prosecution
that took place after Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, for conduct that occurred before
that decision, the district court properly charged
the jury under the standards announced in that
decision.
2. Whether a court of appeals must view
the materials in order to determine whether
they are protected by the First Amendment~
3. Whether the jury was properly instructed to assess the materials in terms of
the community standards of the judicial district from which the jurors were selected and
in which the trial was held.

No. 75-708

2.

Petitioners were indicted, tried and convicted on
several counts for violating 18

u.s.c.

§ 1465, for knowingly

transporting in commerce obscene films., and also were convicted
for conspiring to violate§ 1465.

But, as the SG's brief notes,

petitioners were "caught in a period of transition."

Their con-

duct took place prior to Miller, and their trial took place after
that decision.
We granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, as I recall it, to resolve a conflict among the
circuits as to whether the Miller standards -- to the extent they
differ from the Memoirs/Roth standards, apply retroactively.
Although the Solicitor General opposed the granting of cert, and
appeared to think at that time that the retroactivity issue was
insubstantial, he now agrees with petitioners that CA6 erred in
approving -- in effect -- such a retroactive application.

CA6

(McRee, dissenting) held that the particular films in question
(De~p Throat, etc.) were obscene under any standard.

But, as

pointed out in Judge McRee's dissent, the jury was instructed only
under the Miller standard.

It therefore was not possible for

reviewing courts to be sure what the jury would have concluded had
it been properly instructed.
But, the parties are in agreement in this Court that
there was reversible error on the retroactivity issue.

4

'

No. 75-708

3.

The SG also agrees with petitioners that a court of
appeals must view films

(or other material alleged to be obscene)

in order to determine whether they are protected by the First
Amendment.

Thus, on the second question, the parties are in

agreement and no controversy remains.
The only remaining issue is whether the jury was properly
instructed to apply the contemporary community standards of the
judicial district in which the trial took place rather than
charge the jury on the local community standards of the CincinnatiCovington metropolitan area.

The parties do disagree on this issue,

and I am inclined to think the SG has the better of the argument.
There is language in Hamlin (418 U.S. at 105-06) that
supports the view that ordinarily the judicial district in which
the trial takes place constitutes the relevant community.

Jurors

are drawn from the district, and may be presumed to know as much
about community standards as jurors drawn from some particular
segment of the district.

This may not always be the case, but I

doubt whether this type of difference attains constitutional
dimensions.
This case involved moving pictures being shown in local
theaters in Covington, Kentucky, which is within the metropolitan
area of Cincinnati.

* * * *

4.

No. 75-708

The SG's brief, agreeing with petitioners on what I
thought was the principal issue in this case, considerably undermines its importance.

Subject to f~rther consideration, I think

the case could be disposed of by a per curiam opinion.
The "comIJlunity standards" issue is not free from
difficulty, but I know of no really satisfactory solution.

In

a country as large and diverse as ours, there are relatively few
national standards with respect to arguably obscene material that
fairly could be applied everywhere.

The standards of Times

Square in New York would create a riot in the Ozark Mountains.
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Dave Martin
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August 30, 1976

Marks v. United States

The major issue here concerns a transition problem in
moving from Roth/Memoirs to Miller v. California.

The other

two issues provide an opportunity to clarify a few lingerging
questions after Miller - but it may not be necessary to reach
both of them.

The SG now agrees with petitioner on two of the

three issues.

Hence it might be possible to dispose of the case

-

---

--- - --------------

with a fairly brief per curiam taking care to avoid one minor
.....

-

hidden snare when dealing with the first issue.

I recommend

(1) holding that Miller does not apply retroactively to the
detriment of the defendant, being careful to do so in a narrowly
circumscribed fashion so as not toopen the floodgates to
problems under Bouie v. City of Columbia; (2) making it clear
that an appellate court must view the allegedly obscene materials
when properly requested to do so; (3) approving the district
court's instructions defining the community whose standards are
to be applied.
I.

Facts
Petitioners were convicted in the Eastern District of

Kentucky of conspiracy to transport obscene materials (the
films "Deep Throat and "Swing High" and seven preview clips)
in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C.

§

371, and of the substantive

2.

offense of transporting, id.

§

1465.

They had brought the

films into Newport, Ky., a part of the Cincinnati metropolitan
area, to show at Cinema X, a theatre owned by one of the
petitioners.

The conduct that founded the charge covered a

period up through February 27, 1973, but the trial did not begin
until the following October.

In the interim this Court decided

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (June 21, 1973), and its
compani on cases.
The trial court, over petitioners' objections, instructed
the jury under Miller standards, defining the relevant community
as the entire Eastern District of Kentucky.

The jury found

them guilty, and they were sentenced to 90 days in jail and
(Weick, Engel in the majority)
heavy fines. A divided CA6/approved, swimming against the tide
1
of cases from other circuits, which had all required instructions
reflecting Roth/Memoirs standards for indictments relating to
pre-Miller conduct (Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, and
Memoirs v. Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (plurality opinion)).

In addition,

CA6 held that the materials were obscene under any definition of
obscenity - but CA6 never viewed the films.

Apparently it reliBd

on a detailed and exhaustive description of the films (at least
of the sexual activities portrayed) contained in the affidavit
of an FBI agent.

JA 14.

That affidavit was part of the record

because it had formed the basis for the warrant commanding
seizure of the films.
Judge Mccr e e dissented.

Petitioners were entitled>in

his view, to Roth/Memoirs instructions.

In addition, it is a

3.
footnote to his dissent which reveals that CA6 never saw the
films.

He objects to the majority's speculation that the

films were obscene under any standard, arguing that such
speculation denies the right to trial by jury.
Petitioner raises three questions here, and the SG,
although he opposed cert, has come around to agree with
petitioner on the first two.
II.

Issues
A.

Jury instructions:

Miller or Roth/Memoirs?

The first question is whether petitioners were entitled
to instructions under Roth/Memoirs since all their conduct
occurred prior to Miller.
third part of the test:

Naturally attention focuses on the
under the view of the Memoirs plurality,

building on certain language in Roth, material is constitutionally
protected unless it "is utterly without redeeming social value,"

383 U.S. at 418; under Miller the test is "whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value," 413 U.S. at 24.
Petitioners a ssert that Miller changed the law and expand;d
the statute's reach.

Indeed, they point out, the third part of

the test was explicitly adopted to ease the prosecutor's burden.

413 U.S. at 22.

The effect of Miller is therefore indistinguish-

able from the impact of an ex post facto law, if it is applied
to conduct completed before Miller came down.

The ex post facto

clause does not itself apply to judicial decisions, but

4.
similar due process principles impose similar restrictions.
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 374.
The SG agrees with petitioners' argument on this point,
but he does offer what he regards as the strongest statement
of the opposing position - in a sense it spells out more
carefully the rationale relied on by CA6.

The Memoirs standard

never commanded more than a three-Justice plurality on this
~sf.. . s+,..wla.rds
Court. Moreover, ~A.were a significant departure from Roth.
Hence, no one planning his future conduct could justifiably
rely on the Memoirs restatement of the tests, but had to rely
on Roth alone.

Miller did not significantly depart from Roth;

it merely clarified the tests.

There has thus been no judicial

broadening of the statute, and there is nothing on which ex post
facb principles can operate.
But the SG, having stated the argument, doesn't buy it,
and neither do I.

Miller did emphasize that the Memoirs

by

tests were accepted/only three Justices.

This may have made

it easier for five Justices in Miller to change the formulation,
but it certainly cannot obscure the fact that the Memoirs te~ts
were very much alive in the intervening years.

They were

operative because the other two Justices who made up the
Memoirs majority did not believe that the First Amendment permitted
suppression of obscene materials at all.
never mentioned by CA6).

(Their position is

"[T]he holding of the Court may be

viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred
in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . . " Gregg v. Georgia,
at 12 n. 15 (Opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens).

5.
It was apparently the Memoirs formulation that was applied
in the series of per curiam decisions in obscenity cases
initiated by Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767.

And the circuit

courts that considered the issue before Miller held unanimously
that jury instructions had to be based on the Memoirs tests.
(The cases are collected in the SG's brief, at 30 n. 15).
This consistent circuit court treatment, under United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, has to be accorded a good deal of weight
in deciding whether a new constitutional decision actually
changed the law.

Peltier involved retroactivity for a decision

(Almeida-Sanchez) that benefited defendants,but I see no reason
why this portion of that decision should apply any differently
to a decision like Miller which makes things harder for defendants.
CA6 did not discuss this factor of circuit court treatment)and
its conclusion that Miller did not really change the law suffers
as a result.
Finally, there cannot be much argument that the change was
significant, particularly after the trumpeting the new test got
in the Miller opinion itself.

413 U.S. at 22 (the "utterly without

redeeming social value" test places on the prosecutor"a burden
virtually impossible to discharge under 11111a our criminal standards
of proof").

Clearly it was thought that some conduct which

would have gone unpunished under Memoirs will now result in
conviction.
Since Miller did therefore perform a "judicial enlargement
of a · criminal statute," Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347,
353, both petitioner and SG have no trouble concluding that,

6.
under Bouie, it cannot apply retroactively.

I agree with the

conclusion, but I do not think that Bouie applies quite so
automatically.

The judicial enlargement in Miller was by

no means such a surprise or so "indefensible," 378 U.S., at
354, as what the South Carolina Supreme Court had done in Bouie.
The Miller change really was not all that drastic.

I am concerned

that a hasty reversal citing Bouie will open the doors to Bouie
challenges whenever a court changes the wording of the instructions
that are to be given under a broadly phrased criminal statute or
otherwise performs some minor alteration in the way ai a statute is
~

construed.

Too many such challenges might impede judicial

flexibility in assuring that the language of a statute gets
translated into instructions that really do communicate to the
jury.

The need for judicial flexibility was cited by Justice

Harlan as one important reason why the ex post facto clause
does not apply of its own force to judicial decisions.

James

v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 247 n. 3 (Harlan, J., concurring
and dissenting).
Under review in Bouie were convictions under South Carol!na 1S
criminal trespass statute which forbids entering on the land of
another after notice forbidding entry.

Petitioners there,

Negroes who were taking part in a sit-in demonstration)had
entered the restaurant section of a drugstore.

There was no

notice that the restaurant was closed to blacks, but shortly
after their arrival they were asked to leave.
they were arrested.

When they refused,

The ~C.S Ct upheld their convictions,

construing the statute for the first time to apply to the act

7.
of remaining on the premises after receiving notice to leave.
This Court reversed, holding that an "unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory
language," 378 U.S. at 352, operated like an ex post facto law,
and could not be tolerated.
Bouie was a narrow holding, mentioning at least three
factors that made reversal appropriate:

the changed interpreta2

tion was unforeseeable, it was indefensible,

and it ran counter

to statutory language that seemed clear and precise.

°'"'°'"

The last

~c.+w.s
-+o
+o new interpretation announced in
twoAcannot
be said~llf
the

Miller, so reversal here will mean a stricter application of
Bouie to a law-changing decision.
The opinion here should therefore stress that stricter
application is appropriate only because the statute at issue
regulates speech, and the First Amendment demands a more
exacting application.

Bouie, by its own terms, reversed the

South Carolina court because of the need for fair warning - ~fe.J ~ t~Tc.S
and fair warning is especially important when a statuteh f · g

....

--a.speech.

~

To put it another way, Bouie traces its heritage

i

;

to vagueness cases, and traditional vagueness doctrine has

demanded more exacting judicial scrutiny when a statute impinges
on protected speech.
573.

See,~·&·, Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566,

In this way the impact of this particular nonretroactivity
3

holding can be confined to speech-related statutes.

Cf. Rabe

v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (applying Bouie principles - without
ever citing Bouie - to reverse a state obscenity conviction,
stressing lack of fair notice of the state court's new construction
of the statute).

8.

What I have suggested is consistent with Hamling v.
United States, 418 U.S. 87, even though certain language out
of Hamling helped throw CA6 off the track.

-----

If Hamling had been

a little more explicit, it might have obviated the problems that
arose in this case.
The Hamling petitioners' conduct and trial both occurred
before Miller.
standards.

The charge to the jury set forth the Roth/Memoirs

This Court held that "any constitutional principle

enunciated in Miller which would serve to benefit petitioners
must be applied in their case."
Yet

Id. at 102. (emphasis added).

it seems fairly clear that any benefits resulting from

Memoirs also had to be retained.

The Court examined the record

and determined that the jury could constitutionally have found
the materials obscene under the Memoirs test.

Id. at 100.

It did not finesse that inquiry on the grounds that Memoirs
had no relevance - something it clearly might have done if
4
Miller applied retroactively in all respects.
Hamling did discuss the applicability of Bouie with regard
to one element of the obscenity offense.

Under Miller there

;

must be an explicit enumeration of specific types of sexual
conduct, the depiction of which will be considered obscene if
all the other tests are also met.

413 U.S. at 24.

That

enumeration must appear in the statute or in authoritative
judicial construction.

And Miller, id. at 25, along with the

companion case of United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film,
413 U.S. 123, 130 n. 7,
for the federal obscenity statutes.

established that construction

9.

That construction had not been performed at the time the
Hamling petitioners committed the acIB for which they were charged.
Consequently they argued that the federal obscenity statute was
impermissibly vague, and that under Bouie the new construction
could not be applied to them.

The Court disagreed.

Years

before, Roth had held the statute acceptable against a vagueness
challenge.

The enumeration in Miller, unlike the South Carolina

court's action in Bouie, "did not purport to make criminal . . .
conduct which had not previously been thought criminal.

That

requirement instead added a 'clarifying gloss' to the prior
construction and therefore made the meaning of the federal statute
involved here

'more definite' in its application to federal

obscenity prosecutions."

418 U.S., at 116.

The petitioners

in Hamling, the Court held, could not claim lack of fair notice.
CA6 in the instant case quoted this passage from Hamling
and jumped to the conclusion that Bouie did not apply to any
particulars of Miller, since Miller did nothing but add a
clarifying gloss.

But that conclusion is erroneous.

Hamling
;

held that Miller's

enumeration of specific sexual conduct

did not expand the class of acts which would be considered
criminal, but, for the reasons discussed above> the same cannot
reasonably be said of the third prong of the Miller test, shifting
from "utterly without redeeming social value" to "lacks serious
. value."

That portion of Miller was more than gloss; it

was an important change.

10.
The final sub-question here is exactly what should be the
consequences of remand:

should the matter go back to a new jury

under Roth/Memoirs standards, or is it enough for the appellate
5

court to apply Roth/Memoirs itself?
SG agree that it should go to the jury.

,___....__---square with some

Both petitioners and the
This is a bit hard to

of the things that happened in Hamling.

Here

we are talking about how to implement a transition-period

11111" defendant's right to have the benefits of Memo ;~ s.

In

Hamling, the question was how to implement a similar defendant's
right to the benefits of Miller.

And in Hamling it was enough

for the appellate court to apply Miller's benefits (namely,
enumer ation of specific forbidden depictions, and local community
standards).
There is a certain symmetry to approving appellate application here too.

But I would resist the charms of symmetry in

I

this instance.

There is evident in Hamling and Miller a certain

reverence for jury determination with respect t~hree key tests:
prurient appeal, patent offensiveness, and "serious" or

"redeeming" value.

(The reverence is akin to that for jury

determination of reasonableness in negligence actions.
at 104.)

;

418 U.S.,

These three are clearly the central elements in the

offense under the federal statute, and the accused's right to
trial by jury ought to extend this far.
B.

Must the appellate court view the materials?

The second question need not detain the Court long.

Miller

emphasized that First AIµendment values derive important protection
from "the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an

11.
independent review of constitutional claims when necessary."
413 U.S. at 25.

The Court has not apelled out just what circum-

stances make that independent review "necessary," but Jenkins
v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, has some hard-line language about
not abandoning the "factual" determinations to the unbridled
discretion of the jury.

Id., at 160-61.

Justice Brennan,

joined by Stewart and Marshall, reads Jenkins as leaving no
doubt that appellate courmmust always perform independent
review.

Id., at 163.

Other Justices have occasionally voiced

an equally strong view.

See,~·&·, Manual Enterprises v. Day,

370 U.S. 478, 488 (Harlan joined by Stewart); Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 188 (Brennan joined by Goldberg).
I am not sure why the Court was so coy

in Jenkins - why

it refrained from saying that appellate courts must, whenever
asked, look at the films.
so now.

It seems to me the court could say

The SG has come out squarely in support of this position.

6

He is careful to note that this position does not impose a duty
on this Court to take every case and view every pornographic
movie.

Review woul~ of course, remain discretionary as in any ~

other cert case.

SG brief at 40-41.

appellate courts would be clear.

-

But the general duty of

If the Court is not ready for such a pronouncement, a
second option is available.

The Court could hold that full

independent appellate review was clearly "necessary" here,
because CA6 arrogated to itself the task of deciding that the
materials were obscene under a standard different from the one
the jury employed.

CA6 was, in other words, making a basic

f~ct"~l

12.
determination on its own, and there is no excuse for doing that
without viewing the films.

Since Roth it has been abundantly

clear that materials are to be judged "as a whole."

CA6 could

not make such a judgment on the basis of the agent's affidavit,
even though this agent was one thorough guy.

From his minutely

detailed description, one can undoubtedly tell that the films
are raunchy.
~

But one cannot be sure that such an account,

compiled ex parte by an arm of the prosecution, is a fair
rendering of the material.

And obviously such an affidavit

is not likely to capture the essence of whatever social value
there may be.
A final option is open.

----

If the decision on the first issue

"'-

results in sending the case back to the jury, then it is not
absolutely necessary to pass on the second question at all.
Simply send it back to the district court and hope that CA6
is more prudent next time.
The SG, however, recommends a slightly different sequence.
He evidently would like for this decision to make it clear that

'
the appellate court must view the materials.

If that is the

~

holding, he recommends remand to CA6 for a viewing first.
If that court, applying Roth/Memoirs, determines that the
materials are constitutionally protected, then acquittal is
mandated.

If it finds otherwise, then the case returns to the

DC for a jury trial.

SG brief at 40 n. 22.

If you want to use this case to make clear the appellate
court's duty to view, then the SG's proposed sequence should
probably be followed.

If for any reason you would prefer not

~

13.
to move beyond the strong hints evident in Jenkins (at least
not in this case), then I would simply remand with instructions
for a jury trial under Roth/Memoirs instructions.
C.

Which community's standards?

The third issue is the only one on which the parties are at
odds.

The DC instructed that the jury was to apply the standards

of the community comprising the judicial district, the Eastern
District of Kentucky.

He emphasized that the area extends to

67 counties of Eastern Kentucky, and is not limited to the
environs of Newport.

The relevant instruction is quoted at

length in the SG's brief, at 9 n. 6.
Petitioners charge that this was error, since the jurors
came from metropolitan Cincinnati and since half of them worked
across the river in the city of Cincinnati itself.

(The SG

says there is no evidence of their workplaces in the record.
SG brief at 42 n. 25).

Moreover, it was in metropolitan

Cincinnati that the films were shown.

The instruction was

prejudicial, petitioners say, because the judicial district
embraces even remote rural areas of Appalachia, where standards ~
are likely to be quite different, and the jurors could not
really draw on their own experiences to know what the standards
might be in distant regions.

·- -----

The SG argues that the DC anticipated Hamling, and that
after that case, instructions like those given here are clearly
proper.

Perhaps the standards of metropolitan Cincinnati were

a set of standards that could have been applied, but they were
not the only ones.

Miller approved instructions based on the

14.

entire state of California ~

1'£

the. Miller jurors could comprehend

standards of such a large and diverse state, then the jurors
here could properly apply district-wide standards.
The petitioners, in my view, may well have the better
argument as a matter of logic.

They have hit on what seems to

me one of the real weaknesses in the Miller approach.

As a

matter of logic, if national standards are not to be applied
to prosecutions under federal statutes (and Hamling settled
that), then the standards should be those of the community where
the film is shown and where the people arguably Gffected (in
the broadest sense) reside.
metropolitan Cincinnati.

Here that is almost surely

If the material is not patently

offensive tof hose who drive by the theatre or read the ads in
the paper (those, in other words, who know Deep Throat is
running in the area), then it is hard
it.

to justify suppressing

It makes no difference if people a hundred miles away in

the Appalachian hills might be offended; that community is not
really "affected."

-tW

More importantly, to assu~e~the 67 counties
~

of Eastern Kentucky comprise a "community" with intelligible

y

standards is to indulge in an abstraction as meaningless as
"national" standards.

And national standards have come in for

some rugged criticism from the Court on this basis.

Miller,

413 U.S., at 31-34; Hamling, 418 U.S., at 103-109.
This problem suggests to me that Miller should perhaps
7

be rethought.

I doubt that the Court is interested in doing

so; this case, in any event, provides a poor vehicle.

Assuming

15.
that Miller will be around a while, I feel certain that reversing
on this point would be a mistake.

And it would be inconsistent

with the thrust of Hamling.
If this Court reverses because the instructions should
have focused on metropolitan Cincinnati, then every obscenity
conviction is likely to go through numerous rounds of appeals
and retrials before the instructions finally arrive at a
definition of the appropriate community that will pass muster.
And there are bound to be numerous cases where the "logical"
answer is not as clear as here.

Suppose the theatre had been

20 miles outside of Newport, drawing a substantial audience from
metro Cincinnati, but also a number of rural reprobates.
least two "communities" are involved.

At

There is no totally

adequate definition of community that can really apply in such
a case.
Hamling, in the face of these difficulties, settled for a
pragmatic approach that probably renders acceptable nearly any
,...--___-

formulation short of national standards.

And even a national

standards instruction is likely to be harmless error under the

;

Hamling test, 418 U.S., at 108 - as it was in Hamling itself.
With the facts of the case as they were in Hamling, Hamling
seems to border on cynicism about how seriously any jury is going
to take instructions on community standards.

It seems to say

that even though the judge instructed them to apply national
standards, what the jurors really did was to draw on their own
experience from their own local district:

16.
Since this case was tried in the Southern District
of California, and presumably jurors from throughout
that judicial di s trict were avcialable to serve on the
panel which tried getitioners, it would be the
standards of that 'community" upon which the jurors
would draw.
418 U.S., at 105 - 106.
But whether that particular application was cynical or
not - or correct or not - the basic perception in Hamling
about the purpose and probable effect of community standards
instructions is surely accurate.

Such instructions convey to the

jury that material is not to be judged "on the basis of each
juror's personal opinion, nor by its effect on a particularly
sensitive or insensitive person or group." 418 U.S., at 107.
Practically any instructions which state that community - rather
than individual - standards are to be applied will produce this
effect.

If that is all that is hoped for from community standards

instructions, then there is no point in encouraging protracted
wrangles and intricate appellate review over the exact contours
of a "community."

It would not hurt if district courts could

be sure a community standard instruction based on the judicial ,
district will survive appellate review.

Whatever anomalies

persist (since most judicial districts do not in a functional
sense constitute a community) will simply have to be tolerated.
Here the jurors received instructions which accomplish
the basic purpose Hamling identified.

Moreover, petitioners

were permitted to introduce expert testimony that was based on
Cincinnati's community standards, apparently invoking their
right under Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 121.

Unless

17.
Miller is to be rethought, the community standards instructions
should be sustained.

Such a result will surely be no surprise

after Hamling.

D .M.

ss

.,

Marks

. U.S.
N-1

FOOTNOTES
1.

The following cases have reversed convictions based

on pre-Miller conduct where the DC instructed under Miller;
U.S. v. Wasserman, 504 F.2d 1012 (GAS 1974); U.S. v. Jacobs,
513 F.2d 564 (CA9 1974); U.S. v. Sherpix, Inc., 512 F.2d 1361
(CADC 1975).
Two earlier cases are also important: U.S. v. Thevis, 484
F.2d 1149 (GAS 1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 932; U.S. v.
Palladino, 490 F.2d 499 (CA 1 1974).

In both of these, both

conduct and trial occurred before Miller, and the instructions
1'.a.. CA4 k.t.l.t -tt-..t
derived from Memoirs. AMiller did not void all Memoirs-based
convictions, but that on appellate review, appellants were
entitled to all the benefits of either test.

U.S. v. Line t sky,

533 F.2d 192 (GAS 1976), and U.S. v. Thevis,~ F.2d

~

(GAS

1976), cert. pending, No. 75-1600, decided after the instant
case, are to the same effect.
U.S. v. Hill, 500 F.2d 733 (GAS 1974) should also be
noted.

The trial court give an instruction that seemed based

on Miller, but GAS found, on reviewing the instructions as a
whole, that they really conveyed the "utterly without redeeming
social value" standard to the jury.

Thus the court did not

feel itself obliged to decide whether Miller instructions for
pre-Miller conduct would have been error.
U.S. v. Friedman, 528 F.2d 784 (CAlO 1976), decided after
the instant case, apparently represents the only other circuit
that agrees with CA6.

Cert is pending (No. 75-1663), and

N-2

Charlie's cert memo indicates that that case, despite a few
wrinkles this one does not have, should meet the same fate
as this.
2.

The Bouie court did not emphasize this factor as much

as it did the other two.

In fact, the word "indefensible" comes

in only as part of a quote from Hall, General Principles of
Criminal Law.

378 U.S. at 354.

But it was precisely this L 1
~~ -ti..A. ~""'T'.,......- CA,<
factor and this language upon which the District Court relied"
in order to distinguish Bouie.
3.

Joint Appendix at A49.

It may be, in the end, that judicial constructions

.
1vingAsu
. O..~'/ b Ject
.
· d retroactive
· 1y
invo
matters h ou ld not b e app 1 ie
if they are even minimally detrimental to defendants.

But Bouie

did not hold that, and this case does not necessitate going so
far.

I'd prefer to think about that proposition a while.
4.

Some judges, including both courts belo~ have expressed

difficulty in understanding why Miller itself was remanded
unless the holding of Miller was intended to apply with full
retroactivity.

App. to Petn at Al4; JA at A49; United States

v. Palladino, supra note 1 at 504 (Aldrich, J., dissenting).
But remand makes good sense without full retroactivity if, as
Hamling held, all Miller benefits must be applied even to
defendants who transgressed before June of 1973.

A careful

reading of the remand instructions in Miller, 413 U.S., at 37,
strongly suggests anyway that remand was limited to applying
benefits.

The instructions refer explicitly to the footnote

in U.S. v. 12 200-ft Reels of Film where this Court telegraphs

~

N-3
its intention to construe the federal statute as applying only
to the specific depictions listed in Miller at 25.
specificity requirement

This

is foremost among the "benefits" of

Miller.
5.

CA6, of course, did purport to apply Roth/Memoirs

at the appellate level already.
the films.

But it did so without seeing

As explained in more detail below, I see no way

that its action can be considered adequate appellate review in
circumstances like these.
6.

The SG attaches only one minor qualification, and

it relates to an unusual set of facts in a case pending here
(No. 75-985), held for Marks: U.S. v. American Theatre Corp.,
526 F.2d 48 (CA8 1975).

There defendants stipulated in the

DC to the contents of the films, apparently in order to keep
the jury from seeing them.

On appeal they contended that the

CA had to view the films themselves.

The SG argues that a

defendant whose pursues such a litigating strategy in the DC is
stuck with the stipulation in the CA.

Whichever way American

Theatre comes out, it can be no more than a minor limitation ~
on any rule requiring appellate court viewing at the instance
of the defendant.
7.

[A personal note].

This community standards problem

is only one part of a larger vagueness problem that leaves me
uneasy about Miller.

Before working on this memo, I had never

taken the time to reflect much on obscenity case law.

I find

myself persuaded by much of what Justice Brennan says in Paris
Adult Theatres.

If obscenity could be readily distinguished

N-4
from protected speech, then I would not be greatly troubled
by efforts to suppress it.

But it is no secret that the formula-

tions are imprecise, and have been the subject of much struggle
on the part of courts for years.

Even under the rigid Memoirs

standards, we still have juries and courts permitting a film
an innocuous as Carnal Knowledge to be suppressed - until this
Court steps in as it did in Jenkins.

And all this imprecision

is tolerated despite the presence of two factors which should
counsel otherwise:

the statutes regulate expression, and the

sanction is a criminal one, possibly entailing years in jail.
The fact of criminal sancations despite imprecise standards
is perhaps the most distressing feature.

I would have much less

trouble with abatement actions of some sort, or laws confining
dirty movies and adult book stores to certain limited areas of
town, in line with Young v. American Mini Theatres.
In any event, I have not pursued these thoughts to the
point of any great coherence, because I don't sense any meaningful possibility that Miller will be overruled - certainly not
using this case as a vehicle.

But I hope some day we have the ~

leisure to talk generally about this subject.
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MEMORANDUM

TO:

Dave Martin

FROM:

L.F .P., Jr.

DATE:

December 13, 1976

Marks
I have only one substantive question about the
draft of the .P...:£.:. for the Court.
On page 7, the draft states that Miller brought
about a "judicial enlargement of a criminal statute"
analogous to that addressed in Bouie.
however, takes a different view.

The SG's brief,

It observes (pp. 20, 21)

that S 1465, under which petrs were charged, "is sweeping".
It prohibits all transportation i~ commerce of obscenity
defined broadly and generally.

As the SG put it:

''Miller announced a constitutional standard
that limited the reach of any statute to a
constitutionally defined group of 'obscene'
materials."

-

The SG goes on to say that Bouie and Rabe involve
cases of judicial expanlion of statutory language.

But

''Miller did not expand the scope of a statute, but rather
restricted it".

The prior cases {Roth, Memoirs) also had

restricted the application of obscenity statutes by
applying constitutional limitations.

Miller changed the

2.
constitutional rule.

(SG's brief pp. 21, 22).

The SG's analysis seems to me to be more precise,
although it ends up where you do in the draft.

Putting

it simply, the effect o f ~ was to narrow the reach
of the federal statute; Memoirs further circumscribed
its reach; and Miller, repudiating Memoirs and amplifying
Roth,
..........

enlarged or broadened the ambit of the statute's

prohibition.

These gyrations were achieved, not by

interpreting the statute (as in Bouie), but by defining
the constitutional standard permissible in the application
of obscenity statutes.
Unless there is some flaw in this line of analysis,
I suggest that you make appropriate revisions in the draft.
Otherwise, I think we have a fine draft and excellent
footnotes.

I would be happy to have this go out over my

name rather than a p.c., but I suppose we are limited by
our assignment.

L.F.P., Jr.
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interpreting the statute (as in Bouie), but by defining
the constitutional standard permissible in the application
of obscenity statutes.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 75 708
Stanley Marks et al., Petitioners] On Writ of Certiorari to
v.
the United States Court
·+~ :I St t
,
of Appeals for the Sixth
U 11111'::c ... a es.
(Y
·t
, IrCUl •
[January - , 1977]
PER CURlAM.

This case presents the question, not fully answered in
Hamling v United States, 418 U. S. 87 (1971), whether the
standards announced in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15
(1973), are to be applied retroactively to the potential detri~
ment of a defendant in a criminal case. We granted certiorari, 424 U. S. 942 (1976), to resolve' a conflict in the
circuits/
Two Courts of App('al,, have found instrnctions dE'rived from Miller
appropriate m pro;,ecutions bnsed 011 conduct occurrmg before the Miller
decision came down: United .States v. Marks, 520 F. 2d 913 (CA6 1975)
(the in8tant CME') ; nnd United States v. Friedman, 528 F . 2d 784 (CAIO
1976), p<:'tition for CE'rt. prnding , No. 75-H\B3. Thr('<:' Ca11rtR of Appeahs
have rrv<:'r;;Nl eonvict1ons wher<:' Miller instmctions were given by the
District Court : United States v. Wasserman , 504 F . 2d 1012 (CA5 1974) ;
United States v. Jacobs . 513 F 2d 564 (CA9 1974) ; United States v.
Sherpix. Inc , 168 U. S. App . D . C . 121 , 512 F . 2d 1361 (1975) .
In two earher ca:-;~ both conduct. and trial occnrrrd prior to Miller,
and th<:' Jury mstructiom; werf' drrived from Memoirs v Massach'U,/Jetts,
as3 U. S. 413 (1966) (plmality opinion) . United States v. Thevi
(Thevis 1) , 484 F . 2d 1149 (CA5 1973), cert denird , 418 U . S. 932
(1974) ; United States "· Palladino, 490 F . 2d 499 (CAI 1974) . The
Courts of Appral~ ther<:'. fore:,ha.dowmg to some extent our later decision
in Hamling v. United .States, supra, held that, Miller did not void all
Memoirs-based conviction;.;, but that on revif'w , appellant , were f'ntitled
to all the brnefit;.; of both t }1~ Miller 1111\{ M ernoirs Rtandardi,; Seo
1
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Petitioners were charged with several counts of transport,..,
ing obscene materials in interstate commerce, in violation of
18 U. S. C. § 1465, · and with conspiracy to transport such
materials, 18 U. S. C. §'371. The conduct that gave rise to
the charges covered a period through February 27, 1973,
Trial did not begin until the following October. In the in-.
terim. on June 21, 1973, this Court decided Miller v. California., supra, and its companion cases. 2 Miller announced
new standards for "isolat[ing] 'hard core' pornography from
expression protected by the First Amendment." 413 U. S.1
at 29.a That these new stanqards would also guide the
Hamling, 418 U. S., at 102. In late>r case:; presenting similar facts, the
Fifth Circuit ha,,: a.pplied its holding in Thevi8 I. See, e. g., United
States v. Linetsk.11, 533 F . 2d 192 (CA5 1976); United States v. Thevis
(Thevis II) , 526 F. 2d 989 (CA5 1976), petition for cert. pending, No.
75-1600. See also United States v. Hill, 500 F. 2d 733 (CA5 1974), cert.
denied, 420 l l. S. 952 (1975). And the Ninth Circuit, following Hamling,
has re>ached t.he ,mrne result . United States v. Cutting; 538 F. 2d 835
(CA9 1976) (en bane).
2 Paris Adult Theatre I \. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49 (1973) ; Kaplan v,
California, 413 U. S. 115 (197:3); United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of'
Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973) ; United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973),
a Miller held :

"The bu.sic guidelines for the trier of fact. must be: (a) whether 'tho
average per:son, applying contemporary community standards' would find,
· that tlw work, take>n as a whole, appeals to the prnrient interest ... ;
(b ) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct spe>cifically defined by the applicable state Jaw; ancl
(c) whether the work. U1km as :1 whole, larh serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value." 413 U. S., at. 24.
Under part (b) of the test. it is adequate 1f the statute, as written or·
as judicially corutrued. specifically defines the sexual conduct, depiction
of wlmh is forbidden . The Court in Miller offered examples of wh9t
1:1, State might constitutionally choose to regulate :
"(9) Patently offensive representations or de;;criptiorn; of ultimate.
eexual acts, normal or perverted, actqal or simulated.
~' (b) Patentlr offenHive :rcpre::;entat.ion:- OJ' de:-;cnptions of masturbation,
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future interpretation of the fe<lera] obscenity laws was clear
from United States v. 12 200-foot Reels of Filrn, 413 U. 8.
123. 129-130, and n. 7 (H'J73), decided the same day as Miller.
See Harnh:ng v. United States, 418 U. S., at 105, 113-114.
Petitioners argued in the District Court that they were
entitled to jury instructiqns not under Miller, but under the
more favorable formulation of M enwirs v. Massachusetts ,
383 U. 8. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion). 4 Memoirs, i11 theirview, authoritatively stated the law in effect prior to Miller,
by which petitioners charted their course of conduct. They
focused in particular on the third pa:rt of the M ernoirs test.
Under it, expressive material is constitutionally protede<l
unless it JS "utterly without redeeming social value.'' 383
U. 8., at 418. Cnder Miller the comparable test is "whether
the work, taken as a w11ole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political. or scientific value." 413 U. S., at 24. Miller,
petitioners argue. casts a significantly wider net than
Memoirs. To apply Miller retroactively, and thereby punish
conduct innocent under Memoirs, violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment-much as retroactive apphcatiou of a new statute to penalize conduct innocent when
performed would violate the Constitution's ban on ex post
facto laws, Art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id., § 10, cl. 1. The District
Court overruled these objections and instructed the jury
t•xrrPtorr f1m<'tion:-, nml lt'Wd exh1h1t1on of 1htl g<>uitals." 4m U. S,
HI, 25.

'The pluralit) i11 }le mom, he!J that •'1hrec Pk·ml'nts nuts1 coalesce"
ir matrnal is to hp found ol.>:-rPllf' and therefor£> otttside the protect1011 of
the First Am(•nc1mrn1.:
'·it must b1' l'Hta1.>h:,'hpd t'lw1 (u) till· dominant themt• of the materia1
taken a~ ;1 wholt- appl'a.J~ to a prurwnt mtl-1·rst in Hex, (b) the matE>ria1
fa pi~tently o!frmavr• 'beca 118P 11 affront;, coutrmporary community standards rclntmg 1o the <lt::i<'l'l))tJon or l'<'T>I'l'::i<'ntation of ::;exual ma.ttcrs; and.
(c) the nrn.t<'ri:il i;< 111terl.} without redPemntg ;loc1al value." 8.S:3 U. S.,
at 418.

;

'··
,·
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•

15-708-PER CUJ.UAM

MARKS v. UNITED STATES

under the Miller standards. Petitioners were convicted/' and
divided Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed,
520 F. 2d 913 (1975). We now reverse.

11

II
['he Ex Post Facto Clause is a limitation upon the powers
of the legislature, see Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 385 (1798), and
does not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch of
governme11t. Frank v. Ma;ngum, 237 U. S., 309, 344 (1915).
But the principle on which the cla.use is based-the notion
that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct
which will give rise to criminal penalties-is fundamental to
our concept of constitutional liberty. See United States v.
Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 617 (1954); Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939) . As such, that right is protected
against judicial action by the Due Process Cl~use of the
Fifth Amendment. In Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S.
347 (1964), a case involving the cognate provision of the
Fourtee11th Amendment, we reversed trespass convictions,
finding that they rested on an unexpected construction of the
state trespass statute by the State Supreme Court. We
held:
"[A] n unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal
statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an
ex post facto law such as Art. I, § 10, of the Coustitu..
tion forbids. . . . If a state legislature is barred by
the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, it
must follow that a State Supreme Court is b3rrred by the
Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same
result by judicial construction." Id., at 353-354.
Similarly, in Rabe v. Washington, 405 U. S. 313 (1972),
we reversed a conviction under a state obscenity law because
Petitioner American News Co., Inc., was convicted only on the conspiracy charge. The other four petitioners were convicted of 'conspiracy
{UH~ also on St'ven of the eight suh;,tantive rounts.
5
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it rested on an unforeseeable judicial constrtlction of the
statute. We stressed that reversal was mandated because
affected citizens lacked fair notice that the statute would
be thus applied.
Relying on Bouie, petitioners assert that Miller and its
companion cases unforeseeably expanded the reach of the
federal obscenity statutes beyond what was punishable under
Memoirs. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. It
noted-correctly-that the Memoirs standards never comrna11ded the assent of more than three Justices at any one
time, and it apparently concluded from this fact that
M ernoirs never became the law. By this line of reasoning,
one must judge whether Miller expanded criminal liability
by looking not to Memoirs, but to Roth v. United States, 354
U . S. 476 (1957), the last comparable plenary decision of this
Court prior to Miller in which a majority united in a single
opinion announcing the rationale behind the Court's holding. 0
Although certain language in Roth formed the basis for the
plurality's formulation in Memoirs, Roth's test for qistinguishing obscenity from protected speech was a fairly simple
one to articulate: "whether to the average person, applying
contemporary commuuity standards, the dominant theme of
the material taken as a whole appeals to the · prurient interest." Id., at 489. If indeed Roth, not Memoirs, stated
the applicable law prior to Miller, there would be much to
commend the apparent view of the Court of Appeals that
Miller did not significantly change the law.
But we think the basic premise for this line of reasoning
is faulty. When a fragmented Court decides a case and no
single rationale explainiug the result enjoys the assent of
Shortly after M emoir8, in re;;ponse to the divergence of opinion 11mong
Members of the Court , we began the pral'tice of disposing 'of obscenity
cases · in brief per wriarn deciilion,,;. Redr-up v. New York, 386 U. S. 767
(1967) , was the first. At lea<i1 31 cases were: dPc1ded in this fashion ,
They are collected iu Paris Adult Theatre 1 ¥ . Slaton, 418 U. S. 49, 82-83,
tl. 8 (Hl73) (BRENNAN , .J., clissmting).
6

'·
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five justices. "the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds ... . ." Gregg v. Georgia.,
U.S.-, n. 15 (1976) (opinion of STEWART, PowELL,
and STEVENS, JJ.) . Three Justices joined in the controlling
opi11io11 in Memoirs. Two others, Mr. Justice Black ~nd
Mr. Justice Douglas, concurred on broader grounds in reversing the judgment below. 383 U. S., at 421, 424. They reiterated their well-known position that the First Amendment
provides an absolute shield a.gainst governmental action aimed
at suppressing obscenity. ~R. JUSTICE STEWART also concurred in the judgment, based on his view that only "hardcore pornography" may be suppressed. Id., at 421. See
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 463, 499 (1966)
(STEWART, J .. dissE>nting). The view of the Memoirs plurality therefore constituted the holding of the Court and provided the governing standards. Indeed, every Court of Appeals that considered the question between M ~moirs and
]v.'1:Uer so read our decisions. 7 Materials were deemed to
be constitutionally protected unles.s the prosecution carried
the burden of proving that they were "utterly without redeeming social value,'' and otherwise satisfied the stringent
Memoirs requirements.
Memoirs therefore was the · law. Miller did not simply
clarify Roth; it marked a significitnt departure from Memoirs.
And there can be little doubt that the t hird te,i:;t annouuce<l
in Miller-whether the work "lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value''-expanded criminal liability,
The Court in Miller expressly observed that the "utterly
without redeeming social value'' test places on the prosecutor
"a burden Vll'tually impossible to discharge under our criminal
standards of proof . ' 413 U . H.. at 422. Clearly jt was
·, Sc'l>, e. g., Hook& , Inc I l nited 8tate& , ;35~ F 2d 9:35 (CAl 19tl6),
1·ev'd per cunam, :388 U. S 44\.l ( 196T) ; Vnited States v. 35 mm,
Motion Pict-ur(' Film, 432 ~'. 2d 705 (CA2 ]970) , cert. dismissed sub nom ,

'·
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thought that some conduct which would have gone unpunished under Memoirs would result in convictio11 under
Miller.
This case is not strictly analogous to .{3ouie. The statutory language there was "narrow and precise,'' 378 U. S., at
352, and that fact was important to our ·holdiug tha.t the
expansive construction adopted by the State Supreme Court
deprived the accused of fair wamir,g, In contrast, the statute
involved here always has used sweeping language to describe
that which is forbidden .~ But precisely because the statute
is sweeping, its reach necessarily has been confined within
the constitutional limits annou11ced by this Court. Memoirs
severely restricted its applicatiou. li1iller also restricts its
application beyond what the language might indicate. but
Miller undeniably relaxes the Memoirs restrictions. The
effect is the same as the new construction in Bouie. PetiUnited States v. Unicorn Enterprises, Inc ., 403 U. S. 925 (1971) ; United
States v. 1'eu Erotic Paintings. 432 F. 2d 420 (CA4 1970); United States
v. Groner, 479 F . 2d 577 (CA5 1973) (en bane) (the 7 dissenting Judge::f
and one judge concurring in the m;ult-constituting a majority on this
issue-found that. Memoirs st~ted the governing standard), vacated and
remanded for further con:sidt>ration in light of Miller, 414 U. S. 960
(1973); United States v. Pellegrino, 467 F . 2d 41 (CA9 1972); Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Oklahoma City, 459 F. 2d 282 (CAlO 1972) ;
Huffman v. United States, 152 U . S. App . D . C 238, 470 F . 2d 386
(1971), conviction reversed on otlwr grounds upon rehearing after Miller,
163 U S App. D. C 417, 502 F . 2d 419 (1974) Cf. Grove Press, Inc ,
v. City uf Philadelphia, 418 F. 2d 82 (CAa 19fi9) ; Cinecom '/'heaters
Midwest States, Inc . v City of Fort lVayne , 473 F. 2d 1297 (CA7 19.7:3);
Luros v. United States, 389 F. 2d 200 (CA~ 1968) .
'Thr ,;ta tut<' prov1dc•s 111 pertm<'nt part ·
" Whoever knowingly traru;ports in mten;tate or foreign commerce for
tho purpo8e of ,ml<' or distnbution any ob~c<>ne, lewd , lasr1vious, or filthy
book, pamphlet . pictmc, film . paper, letter, writing, print, 8ilhouette,
drawing, figurr. 1mnge, ca~{., phon~grnph n•oording , electnral tr:rn::icription
or other n.rticlt> capable of prod11rmg sound or nny other matter of indeT
,rent. or immoral chamct<•r, ,;hall be fined not more than $5,000 or impris,Qncq. not morr tlmn five yean-, or both/' 1~ U 8 C. § 1465.
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tio11ers, engaged in the business of marketing dicey films, had
no fair warning that their products might be subjected to the
new standards.u
We h1we taken special care to insist on fair warning when
a statute reguhites expression and implicates First Amendment values. See, e. g., Buckley v. "Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 40-41
(1976); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566, 573 (1974). Section 1465 is such a statute. We therefore hold, in accordance with Bo'U,ie, that the Due Process Clause precludes the
application to ~titioners of the standards announced in
Miller v. California, to the extent that those standards may
impose criminal liability for conduct not punishable under
Memoirs. Specifically, petitioner~ are entitled to jury inIn Hamling we rejrcted a challenge batSed on Bouie v. City of Columbia, supra, superficially i,irnilar to the challenge that is sustained here.
418 U . S., at 115-q6. But the similarity is superficial only. There the
petitioners foct1secl o:Q part. (b) of the Miller test. They argued that
their convictions coulq not stand because Miller requires that the cate0

gories of material punishable under the statute must be specifically
enumerated in the statute or in authoritative ,judicial construction . No
such limiting construction had been announced at the time they engaged
in the conduct that led to their convictions. We held that this made
out no claim under B01ifo, for part (b) did not expand the reach of the
statute. "[TJhe enumeration of specific categories of material in Miller
which might be found obscene did not, purport to make criminal, for the
purpose of 18 U. S. C. § 1461, conduct which had not previorn,ly been
thought criminal." 418 U. S., a.I 116.
For the reasons noted i11 text, tlw same cannot be said of part (c) of
the Miller test, shifting from "utterly without redeeming :;ocial value"·
to "lacks serious litrrary. arfa11c, political or scientific value.'' This was
implicitly recognized by t.he Court in Harnling itself. There the trial
took place before Miller , a.ud the jurr had been instructed in accordance
with Memoirs . H~ verdiet 1wcf,:,;sanly meaut that tt found the materials
to be utterly without redrmnng soriql valtw . This Court. examined the
record and drtt>rminect that the jury\ verdict "was supported by the·
evidence and eom,i:,;tent with the Memoirs formulation of obscenity."
418 U . S., at 100. We did not avoid that inquiry on the grounds that
Me;noirs h:ul no rrlevanev, a,,, we might have done if Miller 11.pplied,
:retroactively in a.Jl respect..,,,

'
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structions requiring the jury to acquit unless it finds that the
materials involved are "utterly without redeeming social
val4e." 10 At the same time we reaffirm our holding in
Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S., at 102, that "any constitutional princtple enunciated in Miller which would serve
to qenefit petitioners must be applied in their case." ll

1"',

-,

-,.

...

I

Reversed and remanded.12

·;.,.
10

The Court of Appea1s stated, apparently ·without viewing the materials themselves, 520 F. 2d, at 9;32 n. 1 (McCree, J., cjissenting), t.lrnt in
its view the materials here were obscene tinder either 1v!emoirs or Miller.
520 F. 2q, at 92i. Such 11, conclusiqn, abr.ent other dependablP mPans of
knO\ying U1e character of t-h e materials, is of dt1bious value. But ~ven
if we accept the court's conclusion, unlfer these circumstances it. is not
an adequitte substih1te for the c!f)cision Ill the ~rist, inst~nce of a. properl;r
instn1cted jury, as to this inwort11nt ~lemer1t of the offense under 18
U. S. C. § 1465.
i
'
'
11 The Court of Appeals 11,ppa1·~ntly t:hopgl1t thitt our remand in Miller
and the companion cases necessarily m~nt tl1at, Miller standards were
fully retroa.ctive. 520 lf. 2d, a.t 920. -~t'Jt ·tl}e passage from Hamling
quoted in the text, which 8impl~1 re11{firml:i ti principle implicit in Miller,
makes it clear t.hat t.he remands carried no littrh implicfltion . Our 1973
cases were remanded for the · court::; belcny tQ apply the "benefits" of
Miller. See n. 3, s7,ipra.
12 In view of our disposition of the ca:,;e, we have no occasion to reach
the other queljtionR prr;;,ented in tlw petitjoi1,

:
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~

Marks v. United States

Dear Lewis:
I am prepared to join your proposed per curiam
but I suggest that for explicit clarification:

~

(1) ~h e f~nf~l s e nten<;e on phage 8. r~ad:
8 eci ica 1 1 y, since t e petitioners are
charged wit conduct occurring prior to
our ecision in Miller v. California, they
are entitled, etc., etc."

~ ~
~

q:t:) a.k_~J
, -;_-;--,--·

~

A

,,~

(2) Following the final sentence on page 9, add:
,,~
"Accordingly, the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion."
,,~

w.:tl "'~

Regards,

I./-rt. ,..

Uj'y6)

-J>~

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~~

J ~4.

4 ~Kt.c. ~

~~~~~
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December 27, 1976

\'

Marks v. United States

No. 75-708
Dear Chief:

I will be happy to make the changes suggested in
your letter of December 27.

......,•

~-~

Sincerely,
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The Chief Justice

;
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The Conference
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December 27, 1976

Re:
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Marks v. united States

Dear Lewis:
I am prepared to join your proposed per curiam
but I suggest that for explicit clarification:
(1) The final sentence on page 8 read:
"Specifically, since the petitioners are
charged with conduct occurring prior to
our decision in Miller v. California, they
are entitled, etc., etc."
(2) Following the final sentence on page 9, add:
"Accordingly, the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion."
Regards,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

J
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Re:

75-708 - Marks v. United States

Dear Lewis:
I joined your proposed per curiam
but it seems to me this is an important
case and deserves a signed opinion.
To show my bona fides, I would
volunteer to sign it if you decline to
do so!

...'

Regards,

\JAUS

.,,.

"'l"}..

Mr. Justice Powell
;'

Copies to the Conference
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Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
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Dear Lewis:

t

I joined your proposed per curiam
but it seems to me this is an important
case and deserves a signed opinion.

.~

'

To show my bona fides, I would
volunteer to sign it if you decline to
do so!

us

Regards,

vJ;_

.....

(~

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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January 4, 1977

Re:

No. 75-70 8 -

Marks v. United States

Dear Lewis:
I do not know what other writings will be forthcoming
on this one but, for the moment at least, please join me. I,
too, think that this should be a signed opinion.
Sincerely,

cJl4
Mr. Justice Powell

cc: The Conference
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Re:
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Marks v. United States

Dear Lewis:
I do not know what other writings will be forthcoming
on this one but, for the moment at least, please join me. I,
too, think that this should be a signed opinion.
Sincerely,

qel4
Mr. Justice Powell

cc:

The Conference
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PER CURIAM.

This case presents the question, not fully answered in
Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87 (1974), whether the
standards announced in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15
( 1973), are to be applied retroactively to the potential detriment of a defendant in a criminal case. We granted certiorari, 424 U. S. 942 (1976), to resolve a conflict in the
circuits. 1
1
Two Courts of Appeals have found instructions derived from Miller
appropriate in prosecutions based on conduct occurring before the Miller
deci:;ion came down: United States v. Marks, 520 F. 2d 913 (CA6 1975)
(the instant case); and United States v. Friedman, 528 F. 2d 784 (CAlO
1976), petition for cert. pending, No. 75-1663. Three Courts of Appeals
ha, o reversed convictions where Miller instructions were given by the
District Court: United States v. Wasserman, 504 F. 2d 1012 (CA5 1974);
United States v. Jacobs, 513 F. 2d 564 (CA9 1974); United States v.
Sherpix, Inc., 168 U. S. App. D. C. 121, 512 F. 2d 1361 (1975).
In two earlier cases both conduct and trial occurred prior to Miller,
and the jury instrurtions were derived from Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
383 U. S. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion). United States v. Thevis
(Thevis I), 484 F. 2d 1149 (CA5 1973), cert deuied, 418 U. S. 932
(1974); United States v. Palladino, 490 F. 2d 499 (CAI 1974). The
Courts of Appeals there, foreshadowing to some extent our later decision
in JI amling v. United States, supra, held that Miller did not Yoid all
Memoirs-based convictions, but that on review appellants were entitled
to all the benefits of both the Miller and Memoirs standnrds. See
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I
Petitioners were charged with several counts of transporting obscene materials in interstate commerce, in violation of
18 U. S. C. § 1465, and with conspiracy to transport such
materials, 18 U. S. C. § 371. The conduct that gave rise to
the charges covered a period through February 27, 1973.
Trial did not begin until the following October. In the interim, on June 21, ·1973, this Court decided Miller v. California, supra, and its companion cases. 2 Miller announced
new standa.rds for "isolat[ing] 'hard core' pornography from
expression protected by the First Amendment." 413 U. S.,
at 29. 3 That these new standards would also guide the
IIamling, 418 U. S., at 102. In later casrs presrnting similar facts , the
Fifth Circuit hns applied its holding in Thevis I. See, e. g., Unit('d
States v. Lin('tsky, 533 F. 2d Hl2 (CA5 1976); United States v. Thevis
(Thevis fl), 526 F. 2d 989 (CA5 1976), petition for cert. pending, No.
75-1600. Sec nlso Unit ed States v. Hill, 500 F. 2d 733 (CA5 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 952 (1975). And the Ninth Circuit, following Hamling,
has reached the same result. United States v. Cutting, 538 F. 2d 835
(CA!.) 1976) (en b:rnc).
2 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49 (1973); Kaplan v.
California, 413 U. S. 115 (1973); United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of
Film, 413 U. S. 123 (1973); United States v. Orito, 413 U. S. 139 (1973).
3 Miller held:
"The basic guidelines for the trier of fart must be: (a) whether 'lhe
average person, applying contemporary rommunity standards' would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . . ;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether Lhc work, taken as fl whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value." 413 U. S., at 24.
Under part ( b) of Lhe test, it is adequ:itc if the statute, as written or
as judicially construed, specifically definrs the sexual conduct, depiction
of which is forbidden. The Cou1t in Mi/l('r offered examples of what
a State might constitutionally choose to regulate:
"(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate
sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
"(b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation,
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future interpretation of the federal obscenity laws was clear
from United States v. 12 200-foot Reels of Filrn, 413 U. S.
123, 129-130, and n. 7 (1973), decided the same day as Miller.
See Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S., at 105, 113-114.
Petitioners argued in the District Court that they were
entitled to jury instructions not under Miller, but under the
more favorable formulation of Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413 (1066) (plurality opinion).• Memoirs, in their
view, authoritatively stated the law in effect prior to Miller,
by which petitioners charted their course of conduct. They
focused in particular on the third part of the M ernoirs test.
Under it, expressive material is constitutionally protected
unless it is "utterly without redeeming social value." 383
U. S., at 418. Under Mill er the comparable test is "whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value." 413 U. S., a.t 24. M1:ller,
petitioners a.rgue, casts a significantly wider net than
Memoirs. To apply Miller retroactively, and thereby punish
conduct innocent under M enioirs, violates the Due Process
Cla.use of the Fifth Amendment-much as retroactive application of a new statute to penalize conduct innocent when
performed would violate tne Constitution's ban on ex post
facto laws, Art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id., ~ 10, cl. 1. The District
Court overruled these objections and instructed the jury
excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." 413 U. S.,
at 25.
4 The plurality in Memoirs held that "three elements must coalesce"
if material is to be found obscene and therefore outside the protection of
the First Amendment:
"it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (h) 1,he material
is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standard,; relating to the description or representation of sexual matter.,; and
( c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value." 383 U. S.,
at 418.
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under the Miller standards. Petitioners were convicted,5 and
a divided Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
520 F. 2d 913 (1975). We now reverse.

II
The Ex Post Facto Clause is a limitation upon the powers
of the legislature, see Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 385 (1798), and
docs not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch of
government. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S., 309, 344 (1915).
But the principle on which the clause is based-the notion
that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct
which will give rise to criminal penalties-is fundamental to
our concept of constitutional liberty. See United States v.
Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 617 (1954); Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939). As such, that right is protected
against judicial action by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. In Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S.
347 (1964), a case involving the cognate provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court reversed trespass convictions, finding that they rested on an unexpected construction
of the state trespass statute by the State Supreme Court:
"[A]n unforeseeable judicia1 enlargement of a criminal
statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an
ex post facto law such as Art. I, § 10, of the Constitution forbids. . . . If a state legislature is barred by
the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, it
must follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by the
Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same
result by judicial construction." Id., at 353-354.
Similarly, in Rabe v. Washington, 405 U. S. 313 (1972),
we reversed a conviction under a state obscenity law because
Petitioner American News Co., Inc., was com·icted only on the conSJ>iracy charge. The other four petitioners were convicted of conspiracy
and nlso on seven of the eight substantive counts.
5

..

75-708-PER CURIAM
MARKS v. UNITED STATES

5

it rested on an unforeseeable judicial construction of the
statute. We stressed that reversal was mandated because
affected citizens lacked fair notice that the statute would
be thus applied.
Relying on Bouie, petitioners assert that Miller and its
companion cases unforeseeably expanded the reach of the
federal obscenity statutes beyond what was punishable under
Memoirs. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. It
noted- correctly-that the M emoirs standards never commanded the assent of more than three Justices at any one
time, and it apparently concluded from this fact that
Memoirs never became the law. By this line of reasoning,
one must judge whether Miller expanded criminal liability
by looking not to Memoirs, but to Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957), the last comparable plenary decision of this
Court prior to Miller in which a majority united in a single
opinion announcing the rationale behind the Court's holding.6
Although certain language in Roth formed the basis for the
plurality's formulation in M emoirs, Roth's test for distinguishing obscenity from protected speech was a fairly simple
one to articulate: "whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of
the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest." Id., at 489. If indeed Roth, not M emoirs, stated
the applicable law prior to M iller, there would be much to
commend the apparent view of the Court of Appeals that
Miller did not significantly change the law.
But we think the basic premise for this line of reasoning
is faulty. When a fragmC'nted Court decides a case and no
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of
6 Shortly after III emoirs, in response to t he divergence of opinion among
Mcmbcr5 of the Court, the Court bep n the prn r ti rc of di~po~ing of obiic:cnity caw's in brief per ruriam dceigionii . R edru p Y. N ew Yo rk, 386 U. S.
767 (1967), was the first. At least 31 cnscs were dcr'iclrd in th i,-; fo~h ion .
They arc collect ed in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slat on, 413 U. S. 49 , 82-83,
n. 8 (1973) (BRE::-.NAN , J. , dissenting) .

'·

;
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five justices, "the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds .... " Gregg v. Georgia,
- U.S.-, n. 15 (1976) (opinion of STEWART, POWELL,
and STEVENS, JJ.). Three Justices joined in the controlling
opinion in Memoirs. Two others, Mr. Justice Black and
Mr. Justice Douglas, concurred on broader grounds in reversing the judgment below. 383 U. S., at 421, 424. They reiterated their well-known position that the First Amendment
provides an absolute shield against governmental action aimed
at suppressing obscenity. MR. JUSTICE STEWART also concurred in the judgment, based on his view that only "hardcore pornography" may be suppressed. Id., at 421. See
Girzzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 463, 499 (1966)
(STEWART, J., dissenting). The view of the Memoirs plurality therefore constituted the holding of the Court and provided the governing standards. Indeed, every Court of Appeals that considered the question between Memoirs and
Miller so read our decisions. 7 Materials were deemed to
be constitutionally protected unless the prosecution carried
the burden of proving that they were "utterly without redeeming social value," and otherwise satisfied the stringent
Memoirs requirements.
Memoirs therefore was the law. Miller did not simply
clarify Roth; it marked a significant departure from M enioirs.
And there can be little doubt that the third test announced
in Miller-whether the work "lacks serious litera.ry, artistic,
political, or scientific value"-expanded criminal liability.
The Court in Miller expressly observed that the "utterly
without redeeming social value" test places on the prosecutor
"n, burden virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal
standards of proof." 413 U. S., at 22. Clearly it was
7
Sec, e. g., Books, Inc. v. United States, 358 F. 2d 935 (CAI 1966),
rcv'd per curiam, 388 U. S. 449 (1967); United States v. 35 mm.
Motion Picture Ji'ilm, 432 F. 2d 705 (CA2 1970), cert. dismissed sub nom.
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thought that some conduct which would have gone unpunished under M enioirs would result in conviction under
Miller.
This case is not strictly analogous to Bouie. The statutory language there was "narrow and precise," 378 U. S., at
352, and that fact was important to our holding that the
expansive construction adopted by the State Supreme Court
deprived the accused of fair warning. In contrast, the statute
involved here always has used sweeping language to describe
that which is forbidden. 8 But precisely because the statute
is sweeping, its reach necessarily has been confined within
the constitutional limits announced by this Court. Memoirs
severely restricted its application. Miller also restricts its
application beyond what the language might indicate, but
Miller undeniably relaxes the Memoirs restrictions. The
effect is the same as the new construction in Bouie. Peti;

United States v. Unicorn Enterprises, Inc., 403 U. S. 925 (1971) ; United
States v. Ten Erotic Painti11os, 4:32 F. 2d 420 (C:\4 1970); Unit,·d States
v. Groner, 479 F. 2d 577 (CA5 1973) (en bane) (the 7 di~sc:1! i1!g judges
and one judge concurring in the result-constituting a m:1jority on this
issur-found that M cmoirs stated the governing standard), vacated and
rrmancled for further consideration in light of Miller, 414 U. S. 969
(1973); United States v. Pellrgrino, 467 F. 2d 41 (CA9 1972); Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Oklahoma City, 459 F. 2d 282 (CAlO 1972);
IJuffman v. United States, 152 U. S. App. D . C 238, 470 F. 2d 386
(1971), conviction reversed on other grounds upon rehearing a.Her Miller,
163 U. S. App. D. C. 417, 502 F. 2d 419 (1974). Cf. Grove Press, Inc.
v. City of Philadelphia, 418 F. 2d 82 (CA3 1969); Cinccom Theaters
Midwest States, Inc. v. City nf Fort Wayne, 473 F. 2d 1297 (CA7 1973);
Luros v. United States, 389 F. 2d 200 (CA8 1968).
8 The statute proYiclcs in pertinent part:
"Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commcree for
the purpose of sale or di~tribution any obsrcnc, lewd, lnscivious, or filthy
book, pamphlet, picture, film, paper, letter, writing, pri 1t, silhouette,
drawing, figure, imnge, cast, phonograph rerording, electrical transcription
or other article capable of producing sound or nny other matter of indecent or immoral character, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 18 U. S. C. § 1465.

75-708-PER CURIAM
8

MARKS v. UNITED STATES

tioners, engaged in the business of marketing dicey films, had
no fair warning that their products might be subjected to the
new standards. 9
We have taken special care to insist on fair warning when
a statute regulates expression and implicates First Amendment values. See, e. g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 40-41
(1976); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566, 573 (1974). Section 1465 is such a statute. We therefore hold, in accordance with Bouie, that the Due Process Clause precludes the
application to petitioners of the standards announced in
Miller v. California, to the extent that those standards may
impose criminal liability for conduct not punishable under
Memoirs. Specifically, since the petitioners were indicted for r
0 In Hamling we rejected a challenge based on Bouie v. City of Columbia, supra, superfi("ially similar to the challenge that is sustained here.
418 U. S., at 115-116. But the similarity is superficial only. There the
petitioners focused on part (b) of the Miller test. They argued that
their convictions could not stand because Miller requires that the categories of material punishable under the statute must he specifically
enumerated in the statute or in authoritative judicial construction. No
such limiting construrtion had been announ0ed at the time they rngaged
in the conduct that led to their convictions. We held that this made
out no claim under Bouie, for part (b) did not expand the reach of the
statute. "[Tlhe enwneration of specific categories of material in Miller
whirh might be found obscene did not purport to make criminal, for the
purpose of 18 U. S. C. § 1461, conduct which had not previously been
thought criminal." 418 U. S., at 116.
For the reasons noted in text, the same cannot be said of part (c) of
the Miller trst, shifting from "utterly without redeeming social rnlue'"
to "l::icks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value." This was
implicitly recognized by the Court in Ilarnling itself. There the trial
took place before Miller, and the jury had been instructed in accordancr
with Memoirs. Its verdict necessarily meant that it found the matrrials
to be utterly without redeeming social value. This Court examined i he
record and determined that the jury's verdict "was supported by the
e,·idence and consistent with the Memoirs formulation of obscenity."
418 U. S., at 100. We did not avoid that inquiry on the grounds that
Memoirs had no relevance, as we might have done if Miller applied
retroactively in all respects.
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conduct occurring prior to our decision in Miller, they are /
entitled to jury instructions requiring the jury to acquit unless
it finds that the materials involved are "utterly without
redeeming social value." 10 At the same time we reaffirm our
holding in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S., at 102, that
"any constitutional principle enunciated in Miller which
would serve to benefit petitioners must be applied in their
case." 11
Accordingly, the case is remanded for further proceedings'
consistent with this opinion.12

10 The Court of Appeals stated, apparently without viewing the materials them•elves, 520 F. 2d, at 932 n. 1 (MrCree, J., dissenting), that in
its view the materials here were obscene under either M cmoirs or Miller.
520 F. 2d, at 922. Such a conclusion, absent other dependable means of
knowing the character of the materi:ds, is of dubiom value. But even
if we accept the courL's co11clusion, under these circumstances it is not
an adequate substitute for 1.hc decision in the first instance of a properly
instructed jury, as to this important clement of the offense under 18
U. S. C. § 1465.
11 The Court of Appeals apparently thought that our remand in Miller
and the companion casPS ncces~arily meant that Miller standards were
fully retroactive. 520 F. 2d, at 920. But the passage from Ilamling
quoted in the text, which simply reaffirms a principle implicit in Miller,
makes it clear that the remands carried no such implication. Our 1973
cases were remanded for the courts below to apply the "benefits" of
Miller. Sec n. 3, supra.
12 In view of our disposition of the case, we have no occasion to reach
the other que.-,tions pre~ented in the petition.
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CHAM B ERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 14, 1977

Re:

No. 75-708 - Marks v. United States

Dear Lewis:
I voted to affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals
at Conference, but think you have written up more persuasively
than I thought could be done the arguments for reversal. I
can subscribe to what I understand are the two basic
premises of your opinion:
(1) the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment prohibits the conviction of a defendant
through an unforeseeable judicial expansion of a statute
defining criminal liabi i -t:y'; ( 2) notwithstanding the fact
that 18 u.s.c. § 1465 prohibiting the transportation of
obscene materials has not been amended, its broad language
was necessarily confined by the decisions of this Court
determining what is, and what is not, obscenity. Although
the formulation of that test in Memoirs never attracted a
majority of the Court, a process of vote counting makes
clear that after that decision and before Miller this Court
would not affirm a conviction which did not satisfy the test
stated by the Memoirs plurality.
My only difficulty with your opinion is the related
problem which we wrestled with last Term in the per curiam
which I wrote in Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48. Frequently a
criminal statute will be sufficiently general in its

-
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language so as to support any one of several reasonable
constructions. When the court of last resort of a particular
state comes to construe a particular section or clause of a
statute for the first time, it should not be unconstitutional
for it to prefer the broadest, rather than the narrowest,
of the reasonable constructions.
Nothing you say in your opinion expressly militates
against this proposition, but I would like to have it pointed
out in some way that the opinion casts no doubt upon it.
If you are amenable to such a comment, you are doubtless in
a better position than I am to decide what it should be and
where it should go. I will then be happy to join you.
If
you decide not to, I will presumably be relegated to the role
of a voice crying in the wilderness.
Since the Chief, Byron, and Harry have already joined
you, I am sending copies of this letter to them.

Sincerely, ~

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Blackmun

/

.in;rrtmt (Q:curl cf tqt 'JRttltt~ ~hrlttt
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

January 26, 1977

Re:

No. 75-708 - Marks v. United States

Dear Lewis:
Your suggested additional footnote in the
above case is all right with me.
Sincerely,

'·

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to:

The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Blackmun
;

~·'
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No. 75-708

Marks v. United States

..
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Dear Bill:

' .

Thank you for yours of January 14, which
neglected.
1

Ai'though 1 perceive no incompatibility or tension .
between~ v't Locke, 423 U.S. 48 and what I have written ,·
, in this case, I am willing - if my ·'joiners ·' concur - to ~,
add a footnote as indicated on the enclosed xerox of page 7
of my opinion.
-~
,, tl
11

If this is agreeable, and unless I hear objection from
others who have joined the opinion,
add this footnote
"
and recirculate later this week.

cc:

i

~1 '

t

''

The Chief Justice

Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Blackmun

.•.'

.§u:;runu <qonrt ttf t4t ~ t h .§tat.ts
jlasfrington, tE}. <q. 2.0ffe'-1-~
CHAMB E RS OF'

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR .

January 26, 1977

No. 75-708

Marks v. United States

Dear Bill:
Thank you for yours of January 14, which I have
neglected.
Although I perceive no incompatibility or tension
between Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 and what I have written
in this case, I am willing - if my "joiners" concur - to
add a footnote as indicated on the enclosed xerox of page 7
of my opinion.
If this is agreeable, and unless I hear objection from
others who have joined the opinion, I will add this footnote
and recirculate later this week.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss
cc:

The Chief Justice

Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Blackmun

~nprtnu ~iru:d cf tlrt ~ttittb ~tafts
11Jaslrhtgfon, l[l. ~. 2llffeJ1-;t
CHAM8ERS OF

January 27. 1977

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re: No. 75-708, Marks v. U.S.

Dear Bill:

I agree.

Sincerely.

?ftA,

<. '

T.M
Mr. Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

.....

,•,

~tutt ~Mtrl irf ur~ ~ttittb ~ta:ttg

.Mfytttgfott, ~. ~. 2.llffe~~
CHAMBERS OF'

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

January 27, 1977

/
Re:

No. 75-708 - Marks v. United States

Dear Lewis:
The addition of the footnote has my approval.

J_
/I~
-

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

,,.

.i'u:p:rtutt (!Iltttrl ltf tlrt 1tni:ttb .itatts
:Jilasfrington. ~. (!I. 2llffe'!$
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 28, 1977

Re:

No. 75-708 - Marks v. United States

Dear Lewis:
Thank you for your letter of January 26th, responding
to my earlier letter suggesting the addition of a footnote.
I quite agree that there is no incompatibility or tension
between Rose v. Locke and your present circulating draft;
my reason for wanting some mention of the former case is
that Bill Brennan's dissent there which took a very expansive
view of the opinion he had written for the Court in Bouie,
claimed that we were doing an injustice to the latter opinion.
Since your present draft relies very much on Bouie, and
rightly so, I thought it desirable to include a reference
to Rose v. Locke as indicating that there are some outer
limits to the Bouie doctrine.
The proposed footnote on page 7 of the circulating draft
which you attached to your letter of January 26th is agreeable
to me. I think it would seem less "out of the blue" if a
phrase could be added summarizing the holding of Rose v.
Locke, but if you prefer to leave the footnote just the way
you have drafted it, I will join in any event. My preference
would be to add the following language so the footnote
you have drafted would read this way:

-
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"For this reason, the instant case is different
from Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1976), where
the broad reading of the statute at issue did
not upset a previously established narrower
construction."

Sincerely~

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to:

The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Blackmun

... ,

~ttpftutt Qj:01lri af tlrt ,mttb .ibdts

-asltinghm. J. Qj:. 2llffe~,
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 28, 1977

Re :

No. 75-708 - Marks v. United States

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,~

.

•

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
,.

No. 75-708
Stanley Marks et al., Petitioners / On Writ of Certiorari to
v.
the United States C?urt
.
of Appeals for the Sixth
U 111'ted St a t es.
c·lrCUl't .

'·.If''

[January -, 1977]
PER CuRrAM.

This case presents the question, not fully answered in
Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87 (1974), whether the
standards announced in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15
(1973), are to be applied retroactively to the potential detriment of a defendant in a, criminal case. We granted certiorari, 424 U. S. 942 (1976), to resolve a conflict in the
circuits.1
Two Courts of Appeals have found instructions derived from Miller
appropriate in prosecutions based on conduct occurring before the Miller
decision came down: United States v. Marks, 520 F. 2d 913 (CA6 1975)
(the instant case); and United States v. Friedman, 528 F. 2d 784 (CAlO
1976), petition for cert. pending, No. 75-1663. Three Courts of Appeals
have reversed convictions where Miller instructions were given by the
District Court: United States v. Wasserman, 504 F. 2d 1012 (CA5 1974);
United States v. Jacobs, 513 F. 2d 564 (CA9 1974); United States v.
Sherpix, Inc., 168 U. S. App. D. C. 121, 512 F. 2d 1361 (1975).
In two earlier cases both conduct and tria1 occurred prior to Miller,
and the jury instructions were derived from Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
383 U. S. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion). United States v. Thevis
(Thevis I), 484 F. 2d 1149 (CA5 1973), cert denied, 418 U. S. 932
(1974); United States v. Palladino, 490 F. 2d 499 (CAI 1974). The
Courts of Appeals there, foreshadowing to some extent our later decision
in Hamling v. United States, supra, held that Miller did not void all
Memoirs-based convictions, but that on review, appellants were entitled
to all the benefits of both the Miller and Memoirs standards. See
1
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Petitioners were charged with several counts of tr+ orting obscene materials in interstate commerce, in violafaon of
18 U. S. C. § 1465, and with conspiracy to transport such
materials,,l18 U. S. C. § 371. The conduct that founded
the charges covered a period through February 27, 1973.
Trial did not begin until the following October. In the interim, on June 21, 1973, this Court decided Miller v. California, supra, and its companion cascs. 2 Miller announced
n'ew standards for "isolat[ing] 'hard core' pornography from
·expression protected by the First Amendment." 413 U. S.,
·at 29. 3 That these new standards would also guide the
!Jamling, 418 U. S., at 102. In later cases presenting similar facts, the
Fifth Circuit has applied it;; holding in Thevis I. See, e. g., United
·S tates v. Linetsky, 533 F. 2d 192 (CA5 1976); United States v. Thevis
(Thevis II) , 526 F. 2d 989 (CA5 1976), petition for cert. pending, No.
·75-1600. See also United States v. Hill, 500 F. 2d 733 (CA5 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 952 (1975). And the Ninth Circuit, following Ilamling,
has reached the same result. United States v. Cutting, 538 F. 2d 835
{CA9 1976) (en bane).
2
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U: S. 49 (1973); Kaplan v.
California, 413 U. S. 115 (1973); United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of
Fi:lm, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
3 Miller held :
"The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the
average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to . the prurient interest ... ;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct speeifically defined by the !IPPlicable ·state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as n whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.'; 413 U. S.; at 24.
Under part (b) of the test,. it is adequate if the statute, as written or
as judicially construed, specifically defines the sexual conduct, depiction
'bf which is forbidden. The Court in Miller offered examples of what
n. State might constitutionally choose to regulate:
"(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate
Sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
"(b) Patently offensive representations or dC8criptions of masturbation 1

?
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future interpretation of the federal obscenity laws was clear
from United States v. 12 200-foot Reeds of Film, 413 U. S.
123, 129- 130, and n. 7 (1973), decided the same day as Miller.
See Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S., at 105, 113-114.
Petitioners argued in the District Court that they were
entitled to jury instructions not under Miller, but under the
more favorable formulation of Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion). 4 Memoirs, in their
view, authoritatively stated the law in effect prior to Miller,
by which petitioners charted their course of conduct. They
focused in particular on the third part of the Memoirs test.
Under it, expressive material is constitutionally protected
unless it is "utterly without redeeming social value." 383
U. S., at 418. Under Miller the comparable test is "whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value." 413 U. S., at 24. Miller,
petitioners argue, casts a significantly wider net than
Memoirs. To apply Miller retroactively, and thereby punish
conduct innocent under Memoirs, violates the Due Process
' Clause of the Fifth Amendment-much as retroactive application of a new statute to penalize conduct innocent when
.performed would violate the Constitution's ban on ex post
facto laws, Art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id., § 10, cl. 1. The District
' Court overruled these objections and instructed the jury
excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." 413 U. S.,
at 25.
4 The plurality in Memoirs held that "three elements must coalesce"
if material is to be found obscene and therefore outside the protection of
the First Amendment:
"it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to a prurient intrrest in sex; (b) the material
is patently offensive because iL affronts contemporary community standards relating 1.o the description or representation of sexual matters; and
(c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value." 383 U. S.,
at 418.

;
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under the Miller standards. Petitioners were convicted,5 and
a divided Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
520 F. 2d 913 (1975). We now reverse.

II
The Ex Post Facto Clause is a limitation upon the powers
of the legislature, sec Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 385 ( 1798), and
does not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch of
government. Frank v. Ma.n gum, 237 U. S., 309, 344 (1915).
But the principle on which the clause is based-the notion
that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct
which will give rise to criminal penalties-is fundamental to
our concept of constitutional liberty. See United States v.
Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 617 (1954); Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939). As such, that right is protected
against judicial action by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. In Bo'uie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S.
347 (1964) , a case involving the cognate provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment, we reversed trespass convictions,
finding that they rested on an unexpected construction of the
·state trespass statute by the State Supreme Court. We
held:
"[A] n unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal
statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an
ex post facto law such as Art. I, § 10, of the Constitution forbids. . . . If a state legislature is barred by
the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, it
must follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by the
Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same
result by judicial construction." Id., at 353-354.
Similarly, in Rabe v. Washington, 405 U. S. 313 (1972),
we reversed a conviction under a state obscenity law because
5 Petitioner American News Co., Inc., was convicted only on the conspiracy charge. The other four petitioners were convicted of conspiracy
and also on seven of the eight substantive cow1ts.
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it rested on an unforeseeable judicial construction of the
statute. We stressed that reversal was mandated because
affected citizens lacked fair notice that the statute would
be thus applied.
Relying on Bouie, petitioners assert that Miller and its
companion cases unforeseeably expanded the reach of the
federal obscenity statutes beyond what was punishable under
Memoirs. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. It
noted-correctly-that the Memoirs standa.rds never commanded the assent of more than three Justices at any one
time, and it ap parently concluded from this fact that
Memoirs never became the law. By this line of reasoning,
one must judge whether Miller expanded criminal liability
by looking not to Memoirs, but to Roth v. United States,
354 U. S. 476 (1957), the last plenary decision of this
Court prior to Miller in which a majority united in a single
opinion announcing the rationale behind the Court's holding. 6
Although certain language in Roth formed the basis for
plurality's formulation in Memoirs, Roth's test for distinguishing obscenity from protected speech was a fairly simple
one to articulate: "whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of
the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest." Id., at 489. If indeed Roth, not Memoirs, stated
the applicable law prior to Miller, there would be much to
commend the :wva.ren,t view of the Court of Appeals that
Miller did not significantly change the law.
But we think the basic premise for this line of reasoning
is faulty. When a fragmented Court decides a case and no
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of
6 Shortly after Memoirs, in response to the divergence of opinion among
Members of the Court, we began the practice of disposing of obscenity
cases in brief per curiam decisions. Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767
(1967), was the first. At least 31 cases were decided in this fashion.
They are collected in Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 82-83,
n. 8 (1973) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).

'
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five justices, "the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds .... " Gregg v. Georgia,
U.S.-, n. 15 (1976) (opinion of STEWART, POWELL,
and STEVENS, JJ.). Three Justices joined in the controlling
opinion in Memoirs. Two others, Mr. Justice Black and
Mr. Justice Douglas, concurred on broader grounds in revers1ng the judgment below. 383 U. S., at 421, 424. They reiterated their well-known position that the First Amendment
provides an absolute shield against governmental action aimed
at suppressing obscenity. MR. JUSTICE STEWART also con-Curred in the judgment, based on his view that only "hardcore pornography" may be suppressed. Id., at 421. Sec
Ginzburg v. United Slates, 383 U. S. 463, 499 (1966)
'(STEWART, J., dissenting). The view of the Memoirs plural1.ty therefore constituted the holding of the Court and provided the governing standards. Indeed, every Court of Appeals that considered the question between Memoirs and
Miller so read our decisions. 1 Thus, materials were deemed
to be constitutionally protected unless the prosecution carried
the burden of proving that they were "utterly without redeeming social value," and otherwise satisfied the stringent
Memoirs requirements.
Memoirs therefore was the law. Miller did not simply
clarify Roth; it marked a significant departure from Memoirs.
And there can be little doubt that the third test announced
in Miller-whether the work "lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value"-e:xpanded criminal liability.
The Court in Miller expressly observed that the "utterly
without redeeming social value" test places on the prosecutor
"a burden virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal
standards of proof.'' 413 U. S., at 22. Clearly it was
• See, e. g., Books, Inc. v. United States, 358 F. 2d 935 (CAl 1966),
rev'd per curiam, 388 U. S. 449 (1967); United States v. 35 mm.
Motion Picture Film, 432 F. 2d 705 (CA2 1970), cert. dismis ·cd sub nom.
7

')
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thought that some conduct which would have gone unpunished under Memoirs would result in conviction under
Miller.
United States v. Unicorn Enterprises, Inc., 403 U. S. 925 (1971); United
States v. 'l'en Erotic Paintings, 432 F. 2d 420 (CA4 1970); United States
v'. Groner, 479 F. 2d 577 (CA5 1973) (en bane) (the 7 dissenting judges
~d one judge concurring in the result-constituting a majority on this
issue-found that Memoirs sta1ed the governing standard), vacated and
remanded for further consideration in light of Miller, 414 U. S. 969
(1973); Unit ed States v. Pellegrino, 467 F. 2d 41 (CA9 1972); Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Oklahoma City, 459 F. 2d 282 (CAIO 1972);
Huffman v. United States, 152 U. S. App. D. C 238, 470 F. 2d 386
(1971), conviction reversed.' on other grounds upon rehearing after Miller,
163 U.S. App. D. C. 417, 502 F. 2d 419 (1974). Cf. Grove Press, Inc .
v. City of Philadelphia, 418 F. 2d 82 (CA3 1969); Cinecom Theaters
·Midwest States, Inc. v. 0ity of Flort Wayne, 473 F. 2d 1297 (CA7 1973);
/AJJ.:..os v. United States, 389 F. 2d' 200 (CA8 1968).
~-------~dll:n Hamling we rejected a challenge based on Bouie v. City of Co. lumbia, supra, superfieially similar to the challenge that is susta.ined here.
418 U. S., at 115-116: But the 8imilarity is superficial only. There the
:petitioners focused on part (b) of the Miller test. They argued that
their convictions could not stand because Miller requires that the categories of material punishable under the statute must be specifically
enumerated in the statute or in authoritative judicial construction. No
such limiting cons1ruction had been announced at the time they engaged
in the conduct that led to their convictions. We held that this made
out no claim ttnder Bouie, for part (b) did not expand the reach of the
statute. "[Tlhe enumeration of specific ca1egories of material in Miller
which might be found obscene did not purport to make criminal, for the
pt\rpose of 18 U. S. C. § 1461, conduct which had not previom,ly been
thought criminal." 418 U. S., at 116.
For the reasons noted in text, the same cannot be said of part (c) of
the Miller test, shifting from "utterly without redeeming social value"
to "lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value." This was
implicitly recognized by the Court in Ilamling itself. There the trial
took place before Miller, and the jury had been instructed in accordance
with Memoirs. Its verdict necessarily meant that i1 found the materials
to be utterly without redeeming social value. This Court examined the
record and determined that the jury's verdict "was supported by the
evidence and consistent with the Memoirs formulation of obscenity."
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This case is not strictly analogous to Bouie. The statutory langua.ge there was "narrow and precise," 378 U. S., at
352, and that fact was important to our holding that the
expansive construction adopted by the State Supreme Court
deprived the accused of fair warning, In contrast, the statute
"involved here always has used sweeping language to describe
that which is forbidden.1> But precisely because the statute
is sweeping, its reach necessarily has been confiined within
'the constitutional limits announced by this Court. Memoirs
severely restficted its application. Miller also restricts its
'applicatio:µ b(,)yond what the language might indicate, but
'it cannot be denied that Miller relaxes the Memoirs restrictions. The effect is the same as the new construction in
Bouie. Petitioners, engaged in the business of marketing
dicey films, had no fair warni~g that their products might
be subjected to the new standards.
We have taken special care to ii;isist on fair warning when
·a statute regulates expression and implicates First Amend"inent values. See, e. g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 40-41
(1976); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566, 573 (1974). Sec"tion 1465 is such a statute. We therefore hold, in accord'ance with Bouie, that the Due Process Clause precludes the
application to petitioners of the standards announced in
Miller v. California, to the extent. that those standards may
impose criminal liability for conduct not punishable under
418 U. S., at 100. We did not avoid that inquiry on the grounds that
Memoirs had no relevance, as we might have done if Miller applied
retroactively in all respec,ts.
.
0 The statute provides in pertinent part:
. "Whoever knowingly tran~ports in intersta.te or foreign commerce for
the pur·pose of sale or distribution any obscene, lewd, lasciviou , or filthy
b_ook, pamphlet, picture, film, paper, letter, writing, print, silhouette,
drawing, figure, image, cast, phonograph recording, electrical transcription
or other n.rticle capable of producing sound or any other matter of indecent or immoral character, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or impris6ned not more than five years, or both." 18 U. S. C. § 1465.
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Memoirs. Specifically, petitioners are entitled to jury instructions requiring the jury to acquit unless it finds that the
materials involved are "utterly without redeeming social
value." 10 At the same time we reaffirm our holding in
Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S., at 102, that "any constitutional principle enunciated in Miller which would serve
to benefit petitioners must be applied in their case." 11
Reversed and remanded.i2

10 Tt1e Court of AppeaJs stated, apparently without viewing the materi:als themselves, 520 F. 2d, at 932 n. 1 (McCree, J., dissenting), that in
its view the materials here were obscene under either Memoirs or Miller.
520 F. 2d, at 922. Such a conclusion, absent other dependable means of
knowing the character of the materials, is of dubious value. But even
if we accept the court's conclusion, under these circumstances it is not
an adequate substitute for the decision in the first instance of a properly
instructed jury, as to this important element of the offense under 18
U. S. C. § 1465.
11 The Court of Appeals apparently thought that our remand in Miller
and the companion cases necessarily meant that Miller standards were
fully retroactive. 520 F. 2d, at 920. But the passage from Hamling
quoted in the text, which simply reaffirms a principle implicit in Miller,
makes it clear that the remands carried no such implication. Our 1973
cases were remanded for the courts below to apply the "benefits" of
Miller. See n. 3, supra.
12 In view of our disposition of the case, we have no occasion to reach
the other two questions presented in the petition.
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This case presents the question, not fully answered in
Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87 (1974), whether the
standards announced in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15
(1973), are to be applied retroactively to the potential detriment of a defendant in a criminal case. We granted certiorari, 424 U. S. 942 (1976), to resolve a conflict in the
circuits. 1
Two Courts of Appeals have found instructions derived from Miller
appropriate in prosecutions based on conduct occurring before the Miller
decision came down: United States v. Maries, 520 F. 2d 913 (CA6 1975}
(the instant case); fl,nd United States v. Friedman, 528 F. 2d 784 (CAlO
1976), petition for cert. pending, ~o. 75-H\63. Thrre Courts of Appeals
have revcri,;cd convictions where Miller instructions were given by the
Di;;trict Court: United States v. Wasserman, 504 F. 2d 1012 (CA5 1974);
United States v. Jacobs, 5i3 F. 2d 564 (CA9 1974); United States v.
Sherpix, Inc., 168 U. S. App. D. C. 121, 512 F. 2d 1361 (1975).
In two earlier cases both conduct and trial orcurrcd prior to Miller,
nnd the jury instrnctions were derived from Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
383 U. S. 413 (1966) (plt\rnlity opinion). United States v. Thevis
(Thevis I) , 484 F. 2d i149 (CA5 1973), cert denied, 418 U. S. 932
(1974); United Stat·es v. Palladino, 490 F. 2d 499 (CAI 1974). The
Courts of Appeals there, forr.;hadowing to some cxtrnt our later decision
in Hamling v. United States, supra, held that, Miller did not void all
j\1 emoirs-based convictions, but that on review appellants were entitled
to all tho bcn<.'fits oJ both tb.o Miller and Memoirs standards. Seo
1
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Petitioners were charged with several counts of transport~
ing obscene materials in interstate commerce, in violation of
18 U. S. C. § 1465, and with conspiracy to transport such
materials, 18 U. S. C. § 371. The conduct that gave rise to
the charges covered a period through February 27, 1973.
Trial did not begin until the following October. In the interim, on June 21, 1973, this Court decided Miller v. California, supra, and its companion cases. 2 Miller announced
new standards for "isolat[ing] 'hard core' pornography from
expression protected by the First Amendment." 413 U. S.,
at 29. 3 That these new standards would also guide the
Hamling, 418 U. S., at 102. In later cas<'s presenting similar facts, the
Fifth Circuit has applied its holding in Thevis I. See, e. g., United
States v. Linetsky, 533 F. 2d 192 (CA5 1976); United States v. Thevis
(Thevis II), 526 F. 2d 989 (CA5 Hl76), petition for crrt. pending, No.
75-1600. See also United States v. Hill, 500 F. 2d 733 (CA5 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 952 (1975). And the Ninth Circuit, following Hamling,
has reached the same result. United .States v. Cutting, 538 F. 2d 835
(CA9 1976) (en bane), cert. denied, 45 U.S. L. W. 3464 (Jan. 10, 1977).
2
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49 (1973); Kaplan v.
California, 413' U. S. 115 (1973); United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of
Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
8 Miller held :
"The basic guidelines for the trier of fact mm;t be: (a) whrther 'the
average per~on, applying contemporary community ;,tandnrds' would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prnricnt intrrrst ... ;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work. taken as fl whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value." 413 U. S., at 24.
Under part (b) of thr test, ii is adequate if the statute, as written or
as judicially construed, specifically defines th<> sexual conduct, depiction
of which is forbidden. The Court in Miller offered examples of what
a State might constitutionally choose to regulate:
"(a) Patently offensive reprc.,;entations or descriptions of ultimate
iiexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
'' (Q) Patently offensive reprcsrntations or descriptions of masturbation,
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future interpretation of the federal obscenity laws was clear
from United States v. 12 200-foot Reels of Film, 413 U. S.
123, 129-130, and n. 7 (1973), decided the same day as Miller.
See Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S., at 105, 113-114.
Petitioners argued in the District Court that they were
entitled to jury instructions not under Miller, but under the
more favorable formulation of Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion). 4 Memoirs, in their
view, authoritatively stated the law in effect prior to Miller,
by which petitioners charted their course of conduct. They
focused in particular on the third part of the Memoirs test.
Under it, expressive material is constitutionally protected
unless it is "utterly without redeeming social value." 383
U. S., at 418. Under Miller the comparable test is "whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.)) 413 U. S., at 24. Miller,
petitioners argue, casts a significantly wider net than
Memoirs. • To apply Miller retroactively, and thereby punish
conduct innocent under Memoirs, violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment-much as retroactive application of a new statute to penalize conduct innocent when
performed would violate the Constitution's ban on ex post
facto laws, Art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id., § 10, cl. 1. The District
Court overruled these objections and instructed the jury
excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." 413 U. S.,
at 25.
4 The plurality in Memoirs lield that "three elements must coalesce"·
if material is to be found obscene and therefore outside the protection of
the First Amendment:
"it must be established that '(a) the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to a ·prurient intrrest in sex; (b) the material
i':i patently offensive because it affronts cont.cmporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; ani:l'
'(c) the material is utterly without red_eeming social value." 383 U. S.,.
1,1,t 418.

.-
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under the Miller standards. Petitioners were convicted,5 anq
a divided Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
520 F. 2d 913 (1975). We now reverse.

II
The Ex Post Facto Clause is a limitation upon the powers
of the legislature, see Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 385 ( 1798), and
does not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch of
government. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S., 309, 344 (1915).
But the principle on which the clause is based-the notion
that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct
which will give rise to criminal penalties-is fundamental to
our concept of constitutional liberty. See United States v.
Harriss, 347 U. S. 612', 617 (1954); Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939). As such, that right is protected
against judicial action by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. In Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S.
347 (1964), a case involving the cognate provision of the
Fourteenth Amehdment, the Court reversed trespass convictions, finding that they rested on an unexpected construction
of the state trespass statute by the State Supreme Court:
"[A]n unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal
statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an
ex post facto law such a.s Att. l, §. 10, of the Constitu . ..
tion forbids. . . . If a state legislature is barred by
the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, it.
must follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by the
Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same
result by judicial construction." Id., at 353-354.
Similarly, in Rabe v. Washington, 405 U. S. 313 (1972)'}
we reversed a conviction under a state obscenity law because
5

Petitioner American News Co., Inc., was convicted only on the conspiracy charge. The other four petitioners were convicted of ronspiracy.{lnd also 'on seven of the eight substantive cgi1nts.
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it rested on an unforeseeable judicial construction of the
statute. We stressed that reversal was mandated because
affected citizens lacked fair notice that the statute would
be thus applied.
Relying on Bouie, petitioners assert that M-iller and its
compa.nion cases unforeseeably expanded the reach of the
federal obscenity statutes beyond what was punishable under
Memoirs. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. It
noted-correctly-that the Memoirs standards never commanded the assent of more than three Justices at a.ny one
time, and it apparently concluded from this fact that
Memoirs never became the law. By this line of reasoning,
one must judge whether Miller expanded criminal liability
by looking not to Memoirs, but to Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957), the last comparable plenary decision of this
Court prior to Miller in which a majority united in a single
opinion announcing the rationale behind the Court's holding.ii
Although certain language in Roth formed the basis for the
plurality's formulation in Memoirs, Roth's test for distinguishing obscenity from protected speech was a fairly simple
one to articulate: "whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of
the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest." Id., at 489. If indeed Roth, not Memoirs, stated
the applicable law prior to Miller, there would be much to
commend the apparent view of the Court of Appea.ls that
Miller did not significa,n tly change the law.
But we think the basic premise for this line of reasoning
is faulty. When a fragmented Court decides a case and no
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of
6 Shortly after Memoirs , in response to the divergence of opinion among
Members of the Court , the Court began the practice of disposing of obscenity cases in brief per curiam decisions. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S.
767 (1967) , was the first. At least 31 cases were decided in this fashion.
They are collected in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 82-83,
n. 8 (1973) (BRENNAN , J ., dissenting) .

.·
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five Justices, "the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds .... " Gregg v. Georgia,
U.S.-, - n. 15 (1976) (opinion of STEWART, PowELL,
and STEVENS, JJ.). Three Justices joined in the controlling
opinion in Memoirs. Two others, Mr. Justice Black and
Mr. Justice Douglas, concurred on broader grounds in reversing the judgment below. 383 U. S., at 421 , 424. They reiterated their well-known position that the First Amendment
provides an absolute shield against governmental action aimed
at suppressing obscenity. MR. JUSTICE STEWART also concurred in the judgment, based on his view that only "hardcore pornography" may be suppressed. Id., at 421. See
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 463, 499 (1966)
(STEWART, J., dissenting). 'The view of the Memoirs plurality therefore constituted the holding of the Court and provided the governing standards. Indeed, every Court of Appeals that considered the question between Memoirs and
Miller so read our decisions.7 Ma.terials were deemed to
be constitutionally protected unless the prosecution carried
the burden of proving that they were "utterly without redeeming social value," and otherwise satisfied the stringent
Memoirs requirements.
Memoirs therefore was the law. Mill er did not simply
clarify Roth; it ma.rked a significant departure from Memoirs.
And there can be little doubt that the third test announced
in Miller-whether the work "lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value"-expanded criminal liability.
The Court in Miller expressly observed that the "utterly
without redeeming social value" test places on the prosecutor
"a burden virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal
standards of proof." 413 U. S., at 22. Clearly it was
7 See, e. g., Books, Inc. v. United States, 358 F . 2d 935 (CAI 1966) ,
rcv'd per c·uriam, 388 U. S. 449 (1967) ; Unit ed States v. 3/j mm,
J'vf o{ion Picture Film,,, 432 f , 2<r705 (CA2 1970) , c~rt. dismissed sub noml
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thought that some conduct which would have gone unpunished under Memoirs would result in conviction under
Miller.
This case is not strictly analogous to Bouie. The statutory language there was "narrow and precise," 378 U. S., at
352, and that fact was important to our holding that the
expansive construction adopted by the State Supreme Court
deprived the accused of fair warning. In contrast, the statute
involved here always has used sweeping language to describe
that which is forbidden. 8 But precisely because the statute
is sweeping, its reach necessarily has been confined within
the constitutional limits announced by this Court. Memoirs
severely restricted its application. Miller also restricts its
application beyond what the language might indicate, but
Miller undeniably relaxes the Memoirs restrictions.u The
United States v. Unicorn Enterpl'ises, Inc., 403 U. S. 925 (1971); United
States v. Ten Erotic Paintings, 432 F. 2d 420 (CA4 1970); United States
v. Groner, 479 F. 2d 577 (CA5 1973) (en bane) (the 7 dissenting judges
and one judge concurring in the re~ult-constituting a majority on this
issue-found that Memoirs stated the governing standard), vacated and
remanded for further consideration in light of Miller, 414 U. S. 969
(1973); United States v. Pellegrino, 467 F. 2d 41 (CA9 1972); Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Oklahoma City, 459 F. 2d 282 (CAlO 1972);
Huffman v. United States, 152 U. S. App. D. C 238, 470 F. 2d 386
(1971), conviction reversed on other grounds upon rehearing after Miller,
163 U.S. App. D. C. 417, 502 F. 2d 419 (1974). Cf. Grove Press, Inc.
v. City of Philadelphia, 418 F. 2d 82 (CA3 1969); Cinecom Theaters
Midwest States, Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, 473 F. 2d 1297 (CA7 1973);
Luros v. United States, 389 F. 2d 200 (CA8 1968).
8 The statute provides in pertinent part:
"Whoever knowingly transports in interstnte or foreign comm<>rce for
the purpose of sale or distribution any obscenr, lewd, lascivious, or filthy
book, pamphlrt, picture, film, paper, letter, writing, print, silhouette,
drawing, figure, image, cast, phonogrnph recording, elt'ctrical transcription
or other article capable of producing sound or any other matter of indecent or immoral charact<'r, shall br fined not more than $5,000 or impris<0ned not more than five years, or both." 18 U. S. C. § 1465.
ti For thi8 reason, the instant case i::; different from Rose v. Locke,

J

15-108-PElt eURIAM
MARKS v. UNITED STATES

effect is the same as the new construction in Bouie. Petitioners, engaged in the business of marketing dicey films, had
no fair warning that their products might be subjected to the
new standards. 10
We have taken special care to insist on fair warning when
a statute regulates expression and implicates First Amendment values. See, e. g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 40-41
(1976); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566, 573 (1974). Section 1465 is such a statute. We therefore hold, in accordance with Bouie, that the Due Process Clause precludes the
application to petitioners of the standards announced in
423 U. S. 48 (1976), where the broad reading of the statute at issue did
not upset a previously established narrower construction.
10 In Hamling we rejected a challenge based on Bouie v. City of Columbia, supra, superficially similar to the challenge that is sustained here.
418 U. S., at 115-116. But the similarity is superficial only. There the
petitioners focused on part (b) of the Miller t<>st. Seen. 3, supra. They
argued that their convictions could not stand because Miller requires that
the categories of material punishable unde.r t.he statute must be specificnlly
enumerated in the statute or in authoritative judicial construction. No,
such limiting construction had been announced at the time they engaged
in the conduct that led to their convictions. We held that this made
out no claim under Bouie, for part (b) did not expand the reach of the
statute. "[T]he enumeration of specifir categories of material in Miller
which might be found obscene did not purport to make criminal, for the,
purpose of 18 U. S. C. § 1461, conduct which had not previously been
thought criminal:" 418 U. S., at 116.
For the reasons noted in text, the same cannot be said of part ( c) of
·the Miller test, shifting from "utterly without redeeming social value"'
to "lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value." This was
implicitly recognized by the Court in Hamling itself. There the trial
took place before Miller, and the jury had been instructed in accordance,
with Memoirs. Its verdict necessarily meant that it found the materials·
to be utterly without redeeming social value. This Court examined the,
record and determined that the jury's verdict "was supported by the,
·evidence and consistent with the Memoirs formulation of obscenity."
418 U. S., at 100. We did not avoid that inquiry on the grounds that
Memoirs had. no relevance, as we might h.Q.ve done if Miller a.r,plied:
tetroactively i!l all resl?ects.
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Miller v. California, to the extent that those standards may
impose criminal liability for conduct not punishable under
Memoirs. Specifically, since the petitioners were indicted for
conduct occurring prior to our decision in Miller, they are
entitled to jury instructions requiring the jury to acquit unless
it finds that the materials involved are "utterly without
redeeming social value." 11 At the same time we affirm our
holding in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S., at 102, that
"any constitutional principle enunciated in Miller which
would serve to benefit petitioners must be applied in their
case." 12
Accordingly, the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.ia

The Court of Appeals stated, appa.rently without viewing the materials themselves, 520 F. 2d, at 932 n. 1 (McCree, J., dissenting), that in
its view the materials here were obscene under either Memoirs or Miller.
520 F. 2d, at 922. Such a conclusion, absent ·other dependable means of
knowing the character of the materials, is of dubious value. But even
if we accept the court's conclusion, under tl1ese circumstances it is not
an adequate substitute for the decision in the 'first instance of a properly
instructed jury, as to this important element of the offense under 18
U. S. C. § 1465.
12 The Court of Appeals apparently thought that our remand in Miller
and the companion cases necessarily meant that Miller standards were
fully retroactive. 520 F. 2d, at 920. But the passage from Hamling
.quoted in the text, which simply rea'fflrms a principle implicit in Miller.,
makes it clear that the remands carried no such implication. Our 1973
cases were remanded for the courts below to apply the "benefits" ,of
Miller. See n. 3, supra.
13 In view of our disposition of t,he case, we, have no occasion to reach
the other questions presented in the petition.
11
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The petitioners / operators of a movie theater in
Newport, Kentucky,/ were charged with transporting obscene
materials in interstate conn:nenc
statute.

in violation of a federal

The alleged violation occurred in early 1973 ;'

J~

before our decision in Miller v. California. I\ Miller w-(/
I

announced new standards~ by which to decide whether
allegedly obscene materials/ are protected by the First
Amendment.
The instructions to the jury ~

on Miller, rather than the prior law.

his cas~ were based

Since the conduct
I

at issue occurred before Miller, we think it was error to
apply the Miller standards retroactively.
We would not impose criminal liability for conduct
not punishable

der the earlier standards.

We therefore

reverse the convictions, and remand the case.

Mr. Justice Brennan filed an opinion concurring in
;

part and dissenting in part, in which Mr. Justice Stewart
and Mr. Justice Marshall joined.

Mr. Justice Stevens

also has filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part.
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Petitioners were charged with transporting obscene materials in violation
of a fiederal statute. The conduct that gave rise to the charge occurred.
before Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, was decided, announcing new
standards for "isolating 'hard core' pornography from expression protected by the First Amendment," id., at 29. Held: The Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment precludes retroactive application to
petitioners of the Miller standards, to the extent that those standards
may impose criminal liability for conduct not punishable under the
standards announced in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413.
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347. Specifically, petitioners are
entitled to jury instructions requiring the jury to acquit unless it finds
that the mat,erials involved are "utterly without redeeming social
value." At the same time, any constitutional principle announced in
Miller that would serve to benefit petitioners must be applied in their
case. Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 102. Pp. 2-9.
520 F. 2d 913, reversed and remanded.
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Cases held for No. 75-708, Marks v. United States
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
No. 75-1663, Friedman v. United States. Petr was
convicted of transporting an obscene book in interstate
commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 1465. He initially was brought to
trial before Miller v. California was decided. The jury was
instructed W1der Memoirs v. Massachusetts, and it found him
guilty. Before CAlO decided his appeal, the Miller decision
was annoW1ced. CAlO vacated the first conviction, remanding
to the District Court for reconsideration in light of Miller.
It did not review the conviction; it simply vacated. 488
F. 2d 1141. Petr was retried and thi~ time, over objection,
the District Court gave instructions based solely on Miller.
Petr appealed his conviction and CAlO affirmed, noting that
petr had been found guilty under both sets of standards and
stating that it thought the book was "filth" under any
standard.
The instructions at the second trial were erroneous under
Marks. The first conviction cannot be used in support of the
judgment since the vacation and remand for a new trial rendered: ~
the first c.onviction void. And the appellate court's determination that the book was obscene is not sufficient in these
circumstances to sustain the conviction. Marks, slip op. at
9, n. 11. I will vote to GRANT, VACATE and REMAND for
reconsideration in light of Marks.

****
No. 75-985, American Theatre Corp. v. United States.
Petrs were convicted of transporting obscene materials by
common carrier in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 1462.

- 2 -

Apparently their conduct occurred after Miller, and there is
no complaint about the Miller-based jury instructions. Petrs
complain instead about CA.S's failure to view the materials two films - and make its own judgment whether or not they
were obscene. CA.8 decided that the materials were obscene
based only on a stipulation of ~ounsel listing the sexual
activities portrayed in the films. Citing CA6's practice
in Marks, CA.8 stated expressly that it had not viewed the
films. Petn App. at A3, n. 2.
In Marks we did not reach the question as to an appellate
court's duty to view allegedly obscene materials, although the
opinion may be viewed as impliedly critical of CA.6 on this
score. Slip op. at 9, n. 11. Miller emphasized "the ultimate
power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review of
constitutional claims when necessary." 413 U.S., at 25.
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160, reaffirmed that
position. But our cases do not establish guidelines for
determining when appellate viewing is "necessary." If the
Court wishes to address this issue, this case may . present a
reasonably good opportunity. But there is the possibility
that the SG will argue that a defendant who relied on a
stipulation in the trial court cannot demand that an appellate
court view the materials. See the SG's brief in Marks, at
39, n. 21.
On balance, I am inclined to Deny on this issue.
The other questions presented challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence and the constitutionality of the statute that
permits the court to tax costs to the defendant. 28 u.s.c.
§ 1918(b).
These are not certworthy. DENY.

L.F.P., Jr.
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No. 75-1663 1 Friedman v. United States. Petr was
convicted of transporting an obscene book in interstate
commerce, 18 U. S.C. § 1465. He initially was brought to
trial before Miller v. California was decided. The jury was
instructed under Memoirs v. Massachusetts, and it found him
guilty. Before CAlO decided his appeal, the Miller decision
was announced. CAlO vacated the first conviction, remanding
to the District Court for reconsideration in light of Miller.
It did not review the conviction; it simply vacated. 488
F.2d 1141. Petr was retried and this time, over objection,
the District Court gave instructions based solely on Miller.
Petr appealed his conviction and CAlO affirmed, noting that
petr had been found guilty under both sets of standards and
stating that it thought the book was "filth" under any
standard.
The instructions at the second trial were erroneous under
Marks. The first conviction cannot be used in support of the
judgment since the vacation and remand for a new trial rendered
the first conviction void. And the appellate court's determination that the book was obscene is not sufficient in these
circumstances to sustain the conviction. Marks, slip op. at
9, n. 11. I will vote to GRANT, VACATE ancf""iEMAND for
reconsideration in light of Marks.
'
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Apparently their conduct occurred after Miller, and there is
no complaint about the Miller-based jury instructions. Petrs
complain instead about CA8's failure to view the materials two films - and make its own judgment whether or not they
were obscene. CA8 decided that the materials were obscene
based only on a stipulation of counsel listing the sexual
activities portrayed in the films. Citing CA6 1 s practice
in Marks, CA8 stated expressly that it had not viewed the
films. Petn App. at A3, n. 2.
In Marks we did not reach the question as to an appellate
court's duty to view allegedly obscene materials, although the
opinion may be viewed as impliedly critical of CA.6 on this
score. Slip op. at 9, n. 11. Miller emphasized "the ultimate
power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review of
constitutional claims when necessary." 413 U.S., at 25.
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160, reaffirmed that
position. But our cases do not establish guidelines for
determining when appellate viewing is "necessary." If the
Court wishes to address this issue, this case may present a
reasonably good opportunity. But there is the possibility
that the SG will argue that a defendant who relied on a
stipulation in the trial court cannot demand that an appellate
court view the materials. See the SG's brief in Marks, at
39, n. 21.
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On balance, I am inclined to Deny on this issue.
The other questions presented challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence and the constitutionality of the statute that
permits the court to tax costs to the defendant. 28 u.s.c . .
§ 1918(b).
These are not certworthy. DENY.
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thought that some conduct which would have gone unpunished under Jvl emoirs would result in conYiction under
Miller.
This case is not strictly analogous to Bouie. The statutory la.nguage there was "narrow and precise," 378 U. S., at
352, and that fact ,rns important to our holding that the
expansive construction adopted by th e State Supreme Court
deprived the accused of fair warning. In contrast, the statute
involved here a1ways has used s,reeping la11guage to describe
that "·hich is forbidden. 8 But precisely because the statute
is sweeping, its reach necessarily has been confined "·ithin
the constitutional limits announced by this Court. M e1,wirs
severely restricted its application. M iller also restricts its
application beyond what the language might indicate, but
Miller undeniably relaxes the Memoirs restrictions.* The
effect is the same as the new construction in Boufa. PetiUnit ed States v. Unicorn Enterprises , Inc., 403 U.S. 925 (1971) ; Unit ed
States v. T en Erotic Paintings. 432 F . 2d 420 (C:\4 1970) ; Unit ed Stat es
v. Groner, 479 F. 2d 577 (CA5 1973) (en bnnc) (the 7 dissenting judges
and on e judge concurring in the m ,ult- constituting a maj ority on this
issuc--found that 1\1 emoirs :::t.ated the gO\·erning standard) , vacated and
remanded for further consid ern.tion in light of Miller, 414 U. S. 969
(1973); Unit ed Stat es v. Pellegrino, 467 F . 2d 41 (CA9 1972) ; Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Oklahoma City, 459 F. 2d 282 (CAIO 1972);
Huffman v. Unit ed States, 152 U. S. App. D . C 238, 470 F. 2d 386
(1971), conviction reversed on other grounds upon rehearing after Miller,
163 U.S. App. D. C. 417, 502 F. 2d 419 (1974). Cf. Grove Press, Inc.
v. City of Philadelphia, 418 F. 2d 82 (CA3 1969); Cinecom Theaters
M idwest States, Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, 473 F . 2d 1297 (CA7 1973);
Luros v. United States, 389 F . 2d 200 (CAB 1968) .
8 The statute provides in pertinent part:
"Whoever knowingly transpo1ts in interstate or foreign commerce for
the purpose of sale or distribution any obscene, lewd, lnscivious, or filthy
book, pnmphlet, picture, film, paper, letter, writing, print, silhouette,
drawing, figure, imnge, cast., phonograph recording, electrical transcription
or other article capable of producing sound or any other matter of indecent or immoral chara cter, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 18 U. S. C. § 1465.

*For this reason, the instant case is far
different from Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48
(1976).

Note to Dave:
I would make a change along the foregoing lines
because changes in the personnel of the Court weaken the
"five Justices" argument.

The point is that the view of

the Memoirs plurality was the holding of the Court and

.••.

followed as such.
~

Add a footnote, keyed to the first sentence above,

citing as "for example" two or three of the cases cited

..
·.

......

in footnote 15 on page 30 of the SG's brief.
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The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment held to preclude
retroactive application to petitioners in prosecution
charging them with transporting obscene materials in
violation of a federal statute, of standards announced
in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, for "isolating 'hard
core' pornography from expression protected by the First
Amendment," id., at 29, to the extent that those standards

'
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may impose criminal liability for conduct not punishable
under the standards announced in Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413.

Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378

u.

S. 347.

Thus, petitioners, who were indicted for conduct occurring
prior to the decision in Miller, are entitled to jury
instructions requiring the jury to acquit unless it finds
that the materials involved are "utterly without redeeming
social value."
. ':

520 F. 2d 913, reversed and remanded.
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Petitioners were charged with transporting obscene materials
in violation of a federal statute.

The conduct ~hich
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gave rise to the charge occurred before Miller v. California,
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413 U.S. 15, was decided, announcing new standards for
"isolating 'hard core' pornography from expression protected
by the First Amendment, 11 id., at 29.

~ , the Due Process

..

'r'°;:,

..

I •

.

Clause of the Fifth Amendment precludes retroactive application to petitioners of the Miller standards, to the extent
that those standards may impose criminal liability for conduct
not punishable under the standards announced in Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413.
378 U.S. 347.

Bouie v. City of Columbia,

Specifically, petitioners are entitled to

jury instructions requiring the jury to acquit unless it
finds that the materials involved are "utterly without
redeeming social value. 11

At the same time, any constitutional. "

principle announced .in Miller that would serve to benefit
petitioners must be applied in their case.

Hamling v.

United States, 418 U.S. 87, 102.

520 F. 2d 913, reversed and remanded.
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Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which Burger, C.J., White, Black.mun, and Rehnquist,
JJ., joined.

Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring

in part and dissenting in part, in which Stewart and
Marshall, JJ., joined.

Stevens, J., filed an opinion

concurring in part and dissenting in part.
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